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ABSTRACT
An investigation of the applicability of existing core
catcher proposals designed to mitigate the effects of a hy-
pothetical reactor core meltdown on a presently envisioned off-
shore, barge-mounted nuclear power plant design is undertaken.
In addition, a new core catcher concept employing a graphite
pebble bed is described and evaluated.
To establish the envelope of design parameter constraints
necessary to both devise and evaluate core catcher concepts, a
detailed description of the one offshore conceptual design
which has progressed far enough to permit specific analysis is
presented. Potential plant system interactions with a hypo-
thetical core catcher are identified, and weight, moment, and
volume limitations are described. An analytical evaluation of
the meltdown sequence, from primary system blowdown to reactor
vessel meltthrough, is carried out to develop the quantitative
aspects of the accident necessary to assess the viability of
the proposed core catcher designs.
It is concluded that none of the previously existing core
catcher designs is completely satisfactory for barge use, pri-
marily due to the excessive weight/volume required, metallurgical
and thermophysical uncertainties, cost and complexity, and the
potential for steam explosions. The graphite pebble bed is
shown to circumvent these problems, freezing the debris almost
immediately upon its entry into the bed, and providing a grace
period of several hours to initiate active cooling, which can
be readily effected using a water spray and flood system.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael J. Driscoll
Title
i




The author deeply appreciates the inspiration and guidance
of Professor Michael J. Driscoll whose suggestions have resulted
in many of the mathematical models to employ and core catcher
proposals to pursue. His assistance has been invaluable through-
out the conduct of this work.
The author also is grateful to Professor Warren C. Dietz
of the Department of Ocean Engineering and Professor Borivoje
Mikic of the Department of Mechanical Engineering for their many
helpful comments on the contents of the thesis. The contributions
of Dr. Mario Fontana of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
providing references and discussing with the author the .general
topic of nuclear accidents are appreciated.
Finally, the author wishes to thank his wife, Linda, for
finding time to type this thesis amidst her normal duties of




Table of Contents i±
List of Figures 7
List of Tables 8
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
1.1 Foreword 9
1.2 Background 9
1.2.1 Energy Demand and Siting Problems 9
1.2.2 Offshore Concept 10
1.2.3 Core Meltdown Accident at Sea 12
1.2.4 Need for, and Current Status of, Core 15
Catcher Design
1.3 Brief Description of the Hypothetical Meltdown 18
1.3.1 Blowdown 19
1.3.2 Core Heatup Without ECCS 19
1.3.3 Core Collapse/collection in the Reactor 21
Vessel
1.3.4 Reactor Pressure Vessel Meltthrough 22
1.3.5 Containment Vessel Meltthrough 23
1.3.6 Summary 25'




1.4.4 Classification of Core Catcher Concepts 28
1.4.5 Description of Core Catcher Proposals 30
1.5 Outline of Report 34
Chapter 2. Current Offshore Conceptual Design 35
2.1 Foreword 35
2.2 Introduction 35
2.3 Platform Structure and Layout 37
2.4 Containment Structure 2^2
2.4.1 Containment Shield Building zj.5
2.4.2 Containment Shell zj.5
2.4.3 Containment Base Plate 45
2.4.4 Containment Interior Structure 24,5
2.5 Engineered Safety Systems ij.5
2.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System 51
2.5.2 Containment Spray System 51
2.5.3 Ice Condenser System 52
2.5.4 Emergency Power System 53
2.5.5 Essential Service Water System 53

Pa^e



























Analysis of the Meltdown Accident
Foreword
Blowdown
Core Heatup Without ECCS





Analysis of Previous Proposals
Introduction
Zivi Sacrificial UO2 Concept
Doan-Crowley Lead Slurry Concept




Jansen Combination Catcher Concept
Summary
The Graphite Pebble Bed Core Catcher
Foreword
Motivation for the Pebble Bed Concept
Pertinent Graphite Properties
Properties of, and Correlations for,
Porous Media
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 Porosity of a Pebble Bed
5.4.3 Laminar vs. Turbulent Flow
5.4.4 Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow
Correlations
Performance Analysis of the Graphite Bed
5.5.1 Interface Temperature Assuming
Semi-Infinite Bodies
5.5.2 Mass of Graphite Required for
Adiabatic Equilibrium
5.5.3 Superficial Velocity Through the Bed
5.5.4 Time for Debris Freezing
5.5.5 Penetration Depth
5.5.6 Post-Freeze Penetration
5.5.7 Post-Freeze Bottom Cooling
Experimental Verification
Summary
Chapter 6. Summary and Recommendations
6.1 Summary















































Appendix A Collection of Pertinent Data 1^7
Appendix B Nomenclature 150




The Floating Offshore Plant 36
The Barge Plant Arrangement 38
Cutaway View of Platform Gompartmentation 40
Below the 40' Level
Top Planar View of Gompartmentation 41
The Containment Assembly 4-3
Sectional View Through Containment 44
Reactor Vessel Configuration Illustrating 47
In-Core Instrumentation Conduits
Ice Condenser System 54
Shure Decay Heat Correlation I 61
Shure Decay Heat Correlation II 62
Transient Temperature History in a 73
Semi-Infinite Solid
Decay Heat Rate vs. Time After Shutdown 83
Total Decay Energy Released vs. Time After 84
Shutdown
West-Fletcher Catcher Concept 98
Schematic Configuration for Convective Flow 100























1.1 Estimated Release of Some Important Nuclides in
Postulated Accidents
16
2.1 Engineered Safety Systems and Potential Core ^9
Catcher Interactions
2.2 Design Data for Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 52
3.1 Concrete Decomposition Data 77
k.l TID-24226 Results for MgO Crucible 90
k,2 Summary of Core Catcher Proposals, Advantages/Dis- 105
advantages
5.1 Pebble-Bed Core Catcher Advantages 111
5.2 Powder-Bed Core Catcher Disadvantages 113
5.3 Candidate Core Catcher Materials 115
5.^ Summary of Predicted Velocities and Times to 133







Environmental considerations restricting onshore siting
and potential cost reductions due to standardization have in-
duced nuclear reactor manufacturers and utilities to initiate
plans for offshore siting of central station units for the
generation of electric power. This concept, however, results
in a significant departure from the reactor's usual environ-
ment. In particular, the presence of the open ocean rather
than earth underneath the plant places increased emphasis on
the provision of added insurance for retention of core melt-
down products in the extremely unlikely event of a severe
loss of coolant accident coincident with failure of emergen-
cy core cooling. It is the purpose of this thesis to eval-
uate means for retention of these core meltdown products to
prevent breach of the plant's confines and the subsequent re-




1.2.1 Energy Demand and Siting; Problems
The United States is presently doubling her energy de-
mands every ten years, producing over 1.^ trillion kwh of
electricity in 1968, almost as much as the next five countries
combined (F*0. While the population has increased by a factor
of five over the last 100 years, the total energy consumed
has risen over seventeen-fold over the same period, indicatirv
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a substantial rise in per capita usage.
Given present technology and the rapid depletion of natural
resources, the electrical industry has recognized that nuclear
power must accept the burden of the increased energy demand.
However, last year 20fo of the electrical utilities' new plants
were delayed by court litigation and k0% by general conservation
and environmental hearings (S3). Most of the public concern
and ensuing delays are centered around land resource depletion,
visual encroachment, thermal pollution, air pollution, and
radiation fears. Alternatives to land-based siting have there-
fore been sought by the electrical industry.
1.2.2 Offshore Concept
In an attempt to ameliorate the environmental impact and
public concern attendant with the siting of nuclear power plants
in populated areas and to benefit economically from an assembly
line production process for the plants, Offshore Power Systems
(OPS), a Westinghouse-Tenneco joint enterprise, announced plans
in August, 1971 , to construct barge-mounted plants which could
be towed to areas offshore and moored there, protected by massive
breakwaters (E2)j General Electric (N6) and Combustion Engineer-
ing have since begun extensive investigations of the offshore
concept. A year later in September, 1972, the Public Service
Electric Gas Company of New Jersey (PSEG) s:igned a $750 million
contract with OPS for construction and delivery of two 1150
megawatt (electrical) nuclear plants to be moored southeast of
Little Egg Inlet, 3 miles offshore and 12 miles northeast of
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Atlantic City (S5). More recently, OPS has revealed it is ne-
gotiating with six other utility groups, all on the east and
gulf coasts, believing to have "better than a 50-50 chance" of
selling four-six platform mounted units by July, 1973 (N^).
The offshore scheme circumvents or totally obviates many
of the existing siting objections listed in Section 1.2.1.
Land resources, at a premium near highly populated coastal areas
where much of the increased power capacity is required, would
not be depleted. By locating far enough at sea, the plants
would not impair the inland and coastal beach scenery. The
thermal pollution that accompanies many land-based plants in
the form of a 10-to 20- degree rise in the temperature of several
miles of downstream river water would be reduced; PSEG engineers
estimate that the maximum rise in the sea water temperature
will be 5 degrees, affecting an area of only 5 acres of ocean
surrounding the plant (Nl). Radiation hazards associated with
normal plant operation would be lowered due to the plant's
location several miles away from the populace and by the result-
ing natural seawater buffer and generally prevailing offshore
winds and weather patterns on the east coast.
Several additional monetary incentives are claimed by OPS
for its concept (D3). By proceeding with site preparation while
the manufacturing of the plant is being carried out at another
location, investment time is reduced. Investment time is further
lowered by a claimed two year reduction in lead time over con-
ventional nuclear plants. Transmission losses and costs are
lowered due to the plant's proximity to the load center.
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Because of its standardized design, the effort required for
plant review by regulatory agencies should be reduced; indeed,
the AEC recently approved "batch licensing" of the offshore
plants, requiring only subsequent approval of specific site
locations and preparation (N5). Finally, since the shipyard
workers will be permanent employees of OPS, as opposed to the
transitory labor force currently utilized in terrestrial nuclear
construction, construction time and costs should decrease as
experience and expertise increase along a learning curve.
However, several postulated accidents are potentially more
severe at sea than on land. In particular, a complete core melt-
down and subsequent containment melt-through, the so-called
"China Syndrome", while to some extent self-sealing on land,
could conceivably contaminate several hundred square miles of
ocean to a level in excess of the maximum allowable concentration
of many nuclides due to wide-range dispersal by currents and
tidal motion.
1.2.3 Core Meltdown Accident At Sea
As with conventional terrestrial plants, the offshore con-
cept must satisfy stringent AEC safety requirements prior to
being licensed for power operation, in particular demonstrating
the capability to prevent core meltdown and the subsequent re-
lease of fission products to the ocean environment in the event
of the "maximum credible accident", a double-ended pipe break
in the primary coolant system. The complete loss of all the
core fission products to the sea is not deemed a credible acci-
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dent, a series of engineering failures being required to lead
to significant core melting. In particular, dual safeguard
systems are used to keep the core subcritical and to remove
the fission product decay heat. The series probability of
failure, first of the primary coolant piping, and then of the
safeguards systems is so small as to render the meltdown acci-
dent " incredible ?• However, it is fair to say that some, both
within and without the nuclear industry, are not convinced
that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) will function as
expected to cool a reactor core following a loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) (G3,F3). The probability of occurrence of a
complete reactor meltthrough will not be further considered in
this thesis; rather, the accident will be assumed to occur and
means for mitigating its consequences will be evaluated.
NOTHING IN THE THESIS IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS LENDING ANY CREDI-
BILITY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CORE MELTDOWN.
The consequences of a nuclear reactor accident at sea have
been investigated by General Dynamics for the Environmental
Protection Agency (Gl). The plant under consideration in this
report was similar to that proposed by Offshore Power Systems
( a 35^0 thermal megawatt, pressurized water reactor system)
but differs in that it was considered to be submerged to a depth
of 250 feet. Two proposed accidents were studied for their
environmental effects: 1) the double ended primary coolant pipe
break, with proper functioning of the Emergency Core Cooling
System preventing gross fuel meltdown, and; 2) a breach of con-
tainment accident caused by collision with a submarine or
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sinking ship, with subsequent primary coolant piping failure
due to thermal or mechanical shock. The first accident assumes,
a s do the safety analyses of all pressurized water plants
for site evaluation, lOOfo of the core's noble gas fission pro-
ducts, $0fo of its halogens, and 1% of its solid fission products
are released to the containment, of which a subsequent leak
rate of 0.1^ per day from the containment to the ocean is pos-
tulated; however, this leak is assumed to occur for only 15
minutes since the properly functioning containment spray system
quickly reduces the containment pressure below sea pressure.
The expected total release to the ocean for this hypothetical
situation is thus
Release = core total x ^ to containment x ~j^ x Y^f~in •
day
For the solid fission products, of which 100^ of core total
could be released in the event of a complete core meltthrough,
only 1 x lO"-^ of the core total is assumed released in this
accident study. The breach of containment accident assumes a
primary coolant activity resulting from operation with lfo of
the fuel elements failed, all of which is discharged to the
surrounding waters following the accident. Additionally, due
to the sudden primary system pressure decrease, all cladding
is assumed to become perforated, resulting in a release of all
fission product activity contained in the fuel-clad gap. The
concentrations of important nuclides resulting from the two
accidents discussed were then computed in terms of a ratio of
actual concentrations to maximum permissible concentration (MPCC)
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of the radionuclide as defined by Ref. B4. The MPCC is deter-
mined for a steady state concentration of the nuclide under
consideration, which does not exist after the accident, and
thus the ratio is conservative for the hypothetical accidents
assumed. Additionally, the actual concentration of at least
some of the nuclides reaching man is dependent upon the assim-
ilation and elimination rates of various marine organisms;
these rates were not considered in determining the concentration
ratios in Ref. Gl, The results for the two accidents are sum-
marized in Table 1.1. For these accidents it is concluded
that harmful effects on marine life are possible for a 10 week
period after the accident. As indicated above, this study
assumes only a very small percentage of the core's fission pro-
duct inventory will actually escape into the ocean environment;
even a conservative extrapolation of Table 1.1 to a complete .
core meltdown results in the conclusion that virtually all
radionuclides would exceed their permissable concentrations by
several orders of magnitude. In view of the potential effects
of an at-sea meltthrough, an investigation into means for mi-
tigating the accident and preventing environmental contamination
is justified.
1.2,4 Need for, and Current Status of, Core Catcher Design
The official public position taken by the Offshore Power
Systems management is that since the probability of occurrence
of the meltdown/meltthrough accident is the same as for terres-




ESTIMATED RELEASE OF SOLE IMPORTANT
NUCLIDES IN POSTULATED ACCIDENTS
Curies Curies
in in C£$jc* CC/KPC
Nuclide Core Coolant + 1 Gap ±JV^A BREACH
Co-58 Baa 1.58 small 4.9
Co-60 ___ 0.18 NC** NC
Sr-89 1.^3(8)# 2.5^ NC NC
Sr-90 8.23(6) 0.12 NC NC
1-131 8.78(7) 1.52(7) 5.K3) 3.M8)
1-133 2.02(8) 1.53(7) 3.3(3) 9.7(7)
Y-91 1.77(8) 1.06(2) 2.3 13.0
Kr-88 1.08(8) 1.93(6) gas gas
Xe-133 2.02(8) 1.99(7) gas gas
# denotes powers of 10




having to develop another line of defense to guard against the
incident (D4). However, the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS) of the AEC stated in November, 1972, that
"OPS should give further consideration to possible means for
assuring maintenance of containment integrity in the highly
unlikely event of core meltthrough, taking into account the
possible advantage of the availability of the large source of
cold water surrounding the platform" (N2).
An advisory task force appointed by the AEC in I966 to
investigate the adequacy of the safeguards systems to protect
against a potential reactor core meltdown and subsequent ra-
dioactive release to the environment concluded that at that
time, reliable and practical methods of handling large molten
masses of fuel did not exist} further, the report pointed out
the desirability of improving the independence of the contain-
ment system as an engineered safeguard (E3). Another group,
convening five years later in 1971t published in BMI-1910 (M3)
the most extensive summary and analysis yet available of the
ability of present containment structures to sustain a core
meltdown (M3)j that report concluded that little had been done
experimentally or conceptually since the publishing of Ref. E3.
Statements made at public environmental hearings indicate that
only minimal effort has been made to develop passive or sem-
passive safety devices to prevent core meltthrough, primarily
because the phenomena are poorly understood, and designers have




Several core catcher proposals are presently in existence,
including three U.S. patents; these will be briefly described
in Section 1.^.3 and critically evaluated in Chapter b. The
concepts employed in all these existing proposals were known
to the authors of Refs. E3 and M3, yet both concluded that
although core catchers were technically feasible, no completely
satisfactory method of containing the molten materials had yet
been designed.
1.3 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL MELTDOWN
Because the ability of any core catcher to retain the molten
debris (core, structural components, and pressure vessel) de-
pends on such factors as the temperature and quantity of molten
material, the fission product decay heat generation within the
debris, and physical/chemical reactions which may even assume
an explosive nature, the sequence of events from primary coolant
rupture to containment vessel meltthrough must be considered.
Although many of the aspects of the accident may be occurring
simultaneously, the major events may be considered to take
place sequentially? broadly grouped in this manner, the events
include (1) primary system blowdown . (2) core heatup without
ECCS, (3) core collapse and collection in the reactor vessel,
(4) reactor pressure vessel meltthrough , and (5) containment
vessel meltthrough . The actual analytical investigation of the
meltdown sequence of events is presented in Chapter 3? the
purpose of this section is to introduce the accident sequence,
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indicating uncertainties, an order-of-magnitude time pro-
gression, and the expected heat load on a potential core catcher.
1.3*1 Blowdown
Immediately following main coolant pipe rupture, the
primary system coolant inventory is rapidly expelled into the
containment, producing steam and hot air which increases the
containment pressure. At a primary system pressure of approx-
imately 600 psi for pressurized water reactors (L1,M1) the
emergency accumulators of the ECCS should function to cover the
core with water; however, as discussed in Section 1.2.3, it is
at least hypothetically possible that the 600 F average fuel
rods immediately steam bind the core (psat for 600 F is 1^-71
psi), preventing the accumulator water from ever reaching the
core. Even if the reactor vessel is refilled, it will boil
dry again in about 10 minutes, assuming the primary coolant
pipe break to be unisolatable (F3). Complete primary system
blowdown has been calculated to occur in 5-30 seconds after
LOCA (M3). Uncertainties in this time-to-blowdown include size
and location of the rupture, geometry of the break ( a smooth
fracture allows a greater mass flow rate than a rough, jagged
tear), and the containment volume backpressure.
1.3.2 Core Heatup Without EGGS
Immediately following LOCA and the ensuing full reactor
scram, with all neutron-absorbing control rods fully inserted,
core power is about 6-7fo of full power, under the conservative
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assumption that the core has operated an effectively infinite
time to achieve an equilibrium full power fission product
inventory. Assuming no external removal of the decay heat from
these fission products, the core materials (cladding, fuel, and
structures) begin a rapid heatup, until eventually the core
geometry is lost due to melting and collapsing of its structural
members.
Several decay heat correlations, predicting the magnitude
of the heat rate as a function of time after shutdown, are in
existence, but the one used in this thesis will be that known
as the "ANS Standard" proposed by an American Nuclear Society
subcommittee and approved for use (when increased by 20$) by
the AEG Regulatory Staff (A2). For order of magnitude heatup
times, however, a correlation developed by Untermeyer and Weils,
which closely reproduces the ANS Standard results, is used be-
cause of its relative simplicity and easily manipulated ana-
lytical form. Metal-water reactions between the zircaloy
cladding and any available steam or water in the reactor vessel
represents additional heat sources which must also be considered.
By applying an adiabatic heatup model to the core mass,
an analytical expression predicting core temperatures versus
time is determined (M3), providing a prediction of time to
collapse. Uncertainties and inaccuracies involved in this
phase of the accident are critical since a longer time of con-
tainment in the core implies a smaller heat source which must
be assimilated later by a postulated core catcher. These un-
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certainties include » (1) the prediction of the decay heat source
(the core will not have operated an infinite time): (2) the
prediction of the metal-water reaction, which is dependent upon
the unknown amount of water left in the vessel; and, (3) use
of an adiabatic model utilizing only the core mass (fuel, clad-
ding, and fuel rod structures) -1— conservative since some heat
will be removed by radiation and conduction to the reactor
vessel walls.
1.3.3 Core Collapse/Collection in the Reactor Vessel
As the core temperature increases, collapse may be pre-
dicted to occur due to melting of the zircaloy clad, melting of
the uranium fuel, melting of fuel rod structural supports, or
embrittlement, at a lower temperature, of any of these materials.
In any event, a temperature is eventually reached which results
in the core, either in large volumes or piecemeal, falling to
the lower grid support. Predicted times for core collapse range
from 5-15 minutes for core hot spots, and 10-60 minutes for the
entire core (M3). The core continues its downward path by melt-
ing through, or collapsing, the lower grid support plate in
about 30 minutes (M3).
As indicated above, the actual mechanism by which the core
will fail is not known, and thus represents a major uncertainty
during' this phase of the accident. Potential chemical or
physical reactions could occur as the molten debris falls into
the vessel head area; steam explosions are a major area of con-
cern during this phase, and could result in an energy release
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of sufficient magnitude to rupture the pressure vessel, scatter-
ing fuel throughout the containment vessel. Uncertainties in
calculations of the total energy resulting from the steam gener-
ation process are many: (1) the amount of water remaining in
the pressure vessel is unknown, but has a significant effect
on the overall transient; (2) the efficiency of the transfer
process is unknown; (3) possible metallurgical reactions result
in a wide range of possible debris melting points, thus affect-
ing the amount of sensible heat available for the reaction; and,
(k) the pressure pulse resulting from an assumed water enthalpy
change is unknown.
Results of most studies of possible steam explosions at
this point in the meltdown, while recognizing many of the un-
certainties listed, conclude that pressure vessel destruction
by explosion cannot be ruled out as a possibility in the sequence
of events following LOCA with no ECCS (Fl, F3, M3). As a result
of the steam explosion potential, it also seems obvious that
a premium should be attached to a core catcher design which does
not rely upon the molten debris impacting water for initial
cooling purposes.
1*3. k Reactor Pressure Vessel Meltthrough
After the molten debris reaches the reactor pressure vessel
bottom, and assuming a vessel-damaging explosion does not occur,
the accident will either be terminated, as the debris solidifies
and cools, or continue, as the debris propagates through the
reactor vessel bottom head. Some analyses (M3, T2) indicate
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that under special circumstances the core may in fact be cool-
able inside the vessel j however, a more likely occurrence is
for the debris, probably at an average temperature of about
5000°F (the U02 melting point), to continue its downward path
by melting through the reactor vessel.
The time to meltthrough depends to a large extent upon the
type of heat transfer mechanism governing the melting process.
Early investigations assumed a purely conductive model (E3, T2),
while Ref. M3 advocates a convective process, resulting in a
much larger heat transfer rate. Depending upon the heat trans-
fer model used and upon the assumed value of the heat transfer
coefficient, times to meltthrough range from 0.1 hours to 5
hours. Potentially, 250 tons of debris, including 100 tons of
fuel and 150 tons of structure and cladding, at 6000°F (boiling
point of UOp) could exit the pressure vessel about one hour
after LOCA. Several additional uncertainties become evident in
considering the vessel meltthrough. The mode of heat transfer
from debris to vessel is unknown, the resulting configuration
of melted vessel and core debris is uncertain (stratification
or mixing), the time for meltthrough can be determined analy-
tically only after assuming temperatures and masses of molten
debris, and how the melting proceeds (funneling or planar pro-
gression) is pure speculation.
1.3*5 Containment Vessel Meltthrough
Following reactor pressure vessel meltthrough, the molten
debris will fall through an essentially voided keyway for the
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bottom-mounted in-core flux mapping system (discussed in Chap-
ter 2) until it encounters a three foot thickness of concrete,
part of the Containment Base Plate with the designed purpose
of acting as a biological shield and forming a part of the con-
tainment. Except for the relatively thin, easily penetrable
steel skin of the barge, this is presently the last barrier
existing on the platform mounted system before the core's
fission product inventory is released to the environment. Ap-
plying an adiabatic heatup model to this meltthrough phase in-
dicates that about O.^J- hours are required to totally decompose
this layer of concrete.
Concrete disintegration begins around 900 F, with rapid
thermal decomposition of CaC0~ beginning around 1^72 F (Rl).
The molten debris will be much hotter than these threshhold
temperatures, so "melting" of the concrete begins immediately,
upon contact with the melt. The decomposition of CaC0~ results
in the production of COp which raises the concern that one could
overpressurize the containment vessel; however, if $0fo of the
base mat of CaC0~ is decomposed, a volume of C0 ? equivalent to
only 32% of the total containment volume results. Damage to the
containment integrity is more important than the problem of
C0
2
production (M3). The major uncertainty associated with
this phase of the meltdown sequence is the manner in which the
concrete barrier is breached. Containing about 20% by volume
of water, the concrete will spall and crack as the water flashes
to steam. Depending upon the physical mechanism, an open path
from containment volume to the area under the containment could

25
occur much more rapidly than the adiabatic model would indicate.
Conservatively, then, no credit will be taken for the time re-
quired to penetrate this last barrier in considering a core
catcher design to be located beneath the containment shield
building. Additionally, for terrestrial plants, no space pre-
sently exists under the containment as in the offshore concept;
thus, previous core catcher concepts have been developed for
emplacement inside the containment and could not take advantage
of the additional delay experienced by the debris in melting
through the containment concrete.
1
•
3 • 6 Summary
The sequence of events involved in a complete core melt-
through has been discussed, indicating order of magnitude times
required in the progression. In addition to the many uncertain-
ties associated with the accident which have been discussed,
an underlying assumption in this thesis is that the contain-
ment can survive the initial blowdown energy; for the offshore
concept under consideration, this is valid due to the presence
of a passive ice condenser system (see Chapter 2) to absorb the
stored coolant energy.
,
As a conservative design base, it will be assumed that
about 250 tons of molten debris at 6000°F exit the pressure
vessel and contact the potential core catcher one hour after
LOCA. At this time the decay heat from a 3^-00 Mwt core is
o
about 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr, as given by the ANS Standard plus 20^
as required by the AEC Regulatory Staff.
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An extremely important conclusion of this preliminary
survey is that the chain of events from LOCA. to pressure vessel
raeltthrough occurs over a sufficient time span to permit oper-
ator action if required to prime, or otherwise deploy, an active
core catcher design.
IA REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK
1.^. 1 Foreword
To provide a proper data base for the discussion and analy-
ses which follow, a survey of previous investigations of per-
tinent aspects of the core meltdown accident is in order. The
following section focuses upon the work considered to be par-
ticularly applicable to the accident in an ocean environment and
to core catcher design.
1.^.2 Background
Particularly concise descriptions of the potential core
meltdown accident and of the subsequent active and passive means
of mitigating its effects are found in TID-24226 (E3) and
BMI-1910 (M3). Ref. E3 reports the work of an advisory task
force appointed in 1966 to investigate the status of emergency
cooling, while Ref. M3 is the last in a series of reports from
Bafcelle-Columbus Laboratories evaluating the applicability of
existing data to the description of reactor accidents.
Present calculational procedures used for predicting the
thermal and hydraulic response of water-cooled reactors to LOCA
and a summary of the design configurations of PWR's and BWR's
are contained in Ref. Yl. This description differs from that
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in Refs S3 and M3 in that the existing safeguards systems are
shown to function properly to prevent gross fuel melting. Eval-
uations of the present-day Emergency Gore Cooling System's
(ECCS) capability to prevent fuel melting are summarized in the
published "Testimony of the ASC Regulatory Staff" on an ac-
ceptance criteria for ECCS (A2).
Although most of the industry's effort has been devoted
to means for preventing core meltdown, in particular through
the design of a more efficient ECCS as discussed in A2, several
core catcher concepts, including three which have been granted
U.S. Patents, have been proposed to stop the molten material
after meltdown has occurred and to prevent its breaching the
reactor containment.
1.4.3 Bibliography
Appendix C provides a partial listing of articles and re-
ports germane to the aspects of core meltdown for light water
reactors which are the subject of the present research. Although
fast reactor core catcher design is not specifically under
consideration in this thesis, Appendix C lists those works ap-
plicable to the accident in Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors,
and which contain information possibly transferable to the
present problem. A more complete listing of appropriate in-
formational sources in the form of a computer retrieved listing
of abstracts may be obtained upon request from the Nuclear
Safety Information Center at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
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l,k,k Classification of Core Catcher Concepts
All core catchers have as their primary function the re-
tention of the molten reactor debris, including fuel and struc-
tures, following core meltdown, in order to prevent breaching
the containment boundary. However, here the similarity ends,
there being many diverse methods envisioned to accomplish the
same end result.
From the point of view of impact on existing plant design
and operation, the most significant and obvious difference in
the various proposals is in their degree of self-sufficiency.
A completely passive core catcher is one which contains no
moving parts, requires no external source of power, and depends
upon no operator action or control signal for its proper oper-
ation. Some designs are completely passive in their concept
while others depend upon some (or all) of the exceptions listed,
and thus are active in concept. If existing plant piping, pumps,
and prime movers can be utilized in an active catcher design,
at least a portion of the premium attached to passive systems
can be overcome.
Another significant difference in the method of operation
of the various proposals is the manner in which the melting pro-
cess is terminated, and the resulting final state of the debris.
The objective of some proposals is to freeze the debris at an
early stage by sufficient heat transfer to lower its temperature
below the melting point, leaving the mass in a solid state;
others would allow the debris to remain molten for a consider-
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able period, terminating its progress through the containment
by the melting of a sacrificial material, thus absorbing the
decay heat in the heat of fusion of the sacrificial material,
and simultaneously diluting the volumetric heat generation rate
of the debris. Since the system remains in the molten state,
water cooling to further remove the decay heat would remain
problematical due to the potential steam explosion consider-
ation as discussed in Section 1.3.^.
Further differences arise in the mode of heat transfer
relied upon to transport energy from the debris to the catcher
heat sink. As discussed above, some proposals rely strictly
upon the heat absorption manifested in a change of state, the
heat of fusion or vaporization of a "coolant". Other designs
require the fission product decay heat to be transferred to
an external sink by pure conduction , convection , or radiation ,
or some combination of the three.
Finally, it is the intent of some core catcher designs to
disperse , or spread, the molten debris into thin layers to in-
crease heat transfer areas, while other catchers would collect
the debris for systematic cooling.
The core catcher proposals discussed in the following
section all utilize various combinations of these principles
in their final designs. Pragmatically, one additional classi-
fication is that of cost effectiveness
—
cheap versus expensive .
Since core catchers are not presently required by the AEC, there
is understandable reluctance to install an extremely expensive
device which many feel will never be called upon to perform
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its designed function but would be deployed merely to allay
public fears of a large fission product release. Reactor de-
signers may also be reluctant to consider core catchers in
view of the fact that a defective in-vessel design is known
to have actually caused a partial meltdown in the Enrico Fermi
fast reactor. Additionally, offshore barge-mounted plant de-
signers must consider the effect of the additional weight and
moment contribution of the core catcher if installed. Exces-
sive cost and/or weight/volume of a proposal could be considered
to constitute a "critical flaw" for that design.
1.4.5 Description of Core Catcher Proposals
A number of conceptual designs of core catchers have been
developed to the point where they can be subjected to profitable
scrutiny. A brief description of these proposals follows.
Indian Point 2 Concept
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for Consoli-
dated Edison's Indian Point 2 Reactor contained a description
of a magnesium oxide-lined steel crucible which would be in-
stalled to provide an additional barrier to back up the Emer-
gency Core Cooling System in the event of a loss of coolant
accident; however, in the seventh supplement to that report
the company stated that the addition of emergency accumulators
to provide core reflood water relegated the crucible to a role
which would never be needed, even under the worst hypothesized
accident—the crucible was therefore not installed. As envi-
sioned, the refractory-lined stainless steel crucible would
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have been located at the bottom of the containment vessel dry-
well which would be filled with borated water to a 30 foot
height, covering the core catcher. The bottom of the crucible
would then be cooled by nucleate boiling of the water, although
most of the decay heat would be removed by boiling at the top
surface.
BMI-1910 Spreader Concept (M3)
As an alternative to attempting to hold the core in a
crucible in a molten state, BMI-1910 suggests the possibility
of spreading the debris into a large diameter, thin, solid layer
which could then be more easily cooled than a compact mass held
in a rigidly confined crucible. This concept has been consider-
ed in detail for fast reactors where the possibility of the
core recombining into a critical configuration exists: a de-
velopment which is not credible for LWR's. After spreading
sufficiently thin such that the debris will solidify and the
layer center will remain below its melting point, water cooling
is again required. The spreading process is not assured with-
out mechanical devices to promote the spreading. The authors
of BMI-1910 recommend three methods to promote the spreading
process? (1) use of a convex surface under the vessel, (2) use
of a "honeycomb" structure, or, (3) by melting materials in the
catcher which would form solutions with, and liquefy the U0 ? at
relatively low temperatures.
Doan-Crowley Lead Slurry Concept (D2)
This concept circumvents the possibility of metal-water
reactions by substituting lead for water in a steel-lined
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crucible in the dry well beneath the pressure vessel. The lead
dilutes the volumetric heat source, increases the heat transfer
area by spreading, and could float the U02 to prevent direct
contact with the crucible. Heat transfer from the U0 ? to the
lead would be primarily by convection and conduction, while the
lead would transfer heat to the ambient primarily by radiation
and evaporation. A variation on this process suggested by
BMI-1910 would cover the lead slab with a pool of water to pro-




This concept closely parallels the Doan-Crowley lead
slurry concept, substituting depleted or unenriched UOp for lead.
The second U.S. patent for a core catcher proposal was granted
for this concept. The preferred method of employing this con-
cept, as described in Ref. Z2, is to encase a dish-shaped layer
of unenriched uranium dioxide in a steel liner and position it
under the reactor vessel. Alternative schemes would place the
device inside the reactor vessel or design it as a part of the
vessel bottom. The U02 barrier is slowly melted by the advanc-
ing debris containing the decaying fission product heat source,
and the heat is thus absorbed in the heat of fusion of the un-
enriched UOp. The upper surface of the pool would be cooled
by vaporizing the steel liner.
West-Fletcher Water-Cooled Crucible (W*Q
Chronologically, the first U.S. patent was issued for this
design concept. Here, a catch basin beneath the reactor vessel
is formed by welding a bank of horizontal tubes together to
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form a liquid-tight container. An upstanding rim is pro-
vided to restrain outward flow of the molten debris. The tubes
are connected via an inlet header to an elevated supply of
water on one end with outlet header piping of less flow resis-
tance opening to the atmosphere somewhere above the inlet supply.
Flow of cooling water through the pipe is then expected to oc-
cur automatically upon heating the basin. To ensure proper flow
direction at initiation, a check valve and/or a cold water trap
is installed in the inlet header. The basin area is sized to
limit the debris thickness such that the top surface will re-
main frozen as the decay heat is removed by the cooling water.
A variation of this scheme could be obtained, as suggested in
the patent, by providing a layer of a second material such as
lead on top of the tubes to initially quench the molten debris.
Japsen Combination Catcher Concept (J3 )
A third U.S. patent has recently (1972) been granted to
this concept, which employs a combination of the proposals de-
scribed above. This design utilizes a ceramic oxide eutectic,
such as basalt, with a relatively low melting point to dilute
the reactor fuel and lower its melting temperature. A second
barrier is provided by a layer of unenriched UOp to function
as described in the Zivi Sacrificial Concept. A layer of fire
brick or other refractory material then separates the steel con-
tainment vessel from the hot debris. Finally, water cooling is
employed by tubes embedded in the containment vessel concrete.
Although this concept was originally intended for fast reactors,
it is adaptable to thermal reactors as well.
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Tong In-Yessel Concept (T2 )
An analysis of the asymptotic, or steady state, meltdown
core configuration in Ref. T2 has indicated that a complete core
meltdown can be retained in the reactor pressure vessel if the
containment volume is flooded above the vessel. A cycle in-
volving the vaporization and condensation of steel is assumed
to cool the debris, removing the fission product decay heat
and preventing meltthrough.
1,5 OUTLINE OF REPORT
A description of the presently envisioned offshore plant
is presented in Chapter 2, indicating where consideration has
been given to the maximum credible accident and discussing
the volume, displacement, and moment considerations attendant
to the installation of another safeguards system, the core
catcher. Following this is an analytical discussion of the melt-
down accident in Chapter 3. The existing core catcher proposals
will be reviewed in Chapter 4, considering their suitability for
use on barge-mounted nuclear plants, with the overall objective
being to prevent breach of the barge confines and the resulting
radioactive release to the surrounding waters. Finally, a new
concept for stopping the molten mass of fuel and structural
material will be described along with analytical and experimental




CURRENT OFFSHORE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
2.1 FOREWORD
In order to both devise and evaluate core catcher concepts
it is essential that the envelope of design parameter con-
straints be established at the outset. For that reason this
chapter v/ill be devoted to the description of the one offshore
design which has progressed far enough to permit specific
analysis. Attention will be focused on aspects of potential
plant system-core catcher interaction. The envisioned floating
plant is a conventional Westinghouse pressurized water reactor
and turbine-generator system utilizing that company's nuclear
steam supply system, turbine generator, auxiliary systems, and
safeguards systems as described in Refs. LI and Ml.
2.2 INTRODUCTION
The present design for the offshore nuclear plant envi-
sioned by Offshore Power Systems is a joint effort of Tenneco
Corporation and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The
floating plant will be a self-contained system including heat
source, steam generating and electrical producing equipment,
and all required auxiliary and emergency systems, mounted on
a floating platform and employing accepted and previously li-
censed system concepts. Floating in an average water depth
of 50 feet while protected by a massive breakwater (Fig. 2.1),
the plant will transmit its product power to the shore through
transmission cables buried underground. The electrical con-
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FIG. 2.1 THE FLOATING OFFSHORE PLANT
=r2-
*THE CONCEPT FOR PSEG OF NEW JERSEY INCLUDES TWO COMPLETE
UNITS FLOATING BEHIND A SINGLE BREAKWATER
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nections, mooring system, and cooling water discharge struc-
tures are designed to accomodate horizontal and vertical barge
movement as the platform follows tidal motion through the
basin's common connection with the surrounding ocean. The nu-
clear fuel is not loaded until the plant is on station, moored,
and protected by the breakwater. Because the barge is designed
to remain afloat within its protective breakwater for its ^0
year lifetime, an elaborate cathodic protection system will be
employed. Refs. 01 and Ml provide a more detailed bverview.
2.3 PLATFORM STRUCTURE AND LAYOUT
The barge which serves as the foundation for the platform
is about *K)0 feet long, 378 feet wide, and ko feet deep, with
a Design Load Waterline of about 32 feet, and a resulting dis-
placement of approximately 268,000 long tons (Fig. 2.2). The
large, square waterplane area provides the barge with extreme
stability, derived from a transverse metacentric height (GM)
of 3^0 feet, which compares to only 20 feet for most large
tankers. The moment to heel one degree is about 952,000 foot-
tons, while the moment-to-trim-one-inch (MTI) is about 13,^-0
foot-tons; for added-weight considerations, the tons-per-inch-
immersion (TPI) is about 390 tons. These hydrostatically de-
rived values are necessary for an analysis of a potential core
catcher's impact on the barge trim and draft. To meet U.S.
Coast Guard requirements for a two-compartment standard of
subdivision and to provide longitudinal and transverse strength
for the platform and machinery weight, the barge is divided by
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40 foot deep bulkheads, spaced 37 3/4 feet apart in the trans-
verse direction and 47 to 82 feet apart in the longitudinal
direction, providing a grillage arrangement of shear webs se-
parating the bottom shell and the strength deck at the 40 foot
level as shown in Figs. 2.3 and 2.4. Additional strength is
provided by panel stiffeners used on the top deck and bottom
shell in conjunction with deep girders spaced 10 to 12 feet
between bulkheads. The compartment located directly under the
reactor vessel (area bounded by transverse bulkheads F and G
and longitudinal bulkheads 3 and 4 in Fig. 2.4) is 47 feet
long and 37 3/^ feet wide with the core approximately centered
over the area. The watertight boundaries enclosing this. com-
partment (area bounded by transverse bulkheads F and H and
longitudinal bulkheads 3 and 4 in Fig. 2.4) encompass an area
47 feet long and 75 1/2 feet wide. The compartment under the
reactor vessel (bounded by bulkheads F-G and 3-^) is further
divided by deep transverse girders extending from the bottom
shell to the 7 1/2 foot overhead. These non-watertight girders
divide the 47 foot spacing between bulkheads 3 and 4 into 4
spaces of 11' 9" width. Perpendicular to these girders are
shallow longitudinal stiffners, about 20" high and spaced about
3.15 feet apart, dividing the 37*75 foot spacing between bulk-
heads F and G into 12 spaces. Both the watertight and the non-
watertight compartments are bounded overhead at the 7 1/2 foot
level and below by the bottom shell; this results in a total
watertight volume of 26,613 cubic feet, over twice the volume

FIG. 2.3 CUTAWAY VIEW OF PLATFORM COMPARTMENTATION
BELOW THE 40» LEVEL

kl
FIG. 2.4 TOP PLANAR VIEW OF COMPARTMENTATION
NOTE-BROKEN LINE "X" INDICATES BOUNDS OF WATERTIGHT COMPARTMENT
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of the entire primary system coolant. Any potential core
catcher concept readily adaptable to the present configuration
should be contained in this compartment space. A maximum plat-
form angle of less than 1° in pitch and 0.7° in roll has
been assumed in the preliminary design, and these values should
not be exceeded as a result of the added weight or moment of
the proposed core catcher if backfitting is to be feasible.
The sixty spaces formed by the 7 longitudinal bulkheads
(including sides) and 11 transverse bulkheads (including sides)
are connected to form 30 v/atertight compartments, sized to en-
sure t (1) flooding of any two adjacent compartments does not
sink any part of the 40 foot deck below the water level; (2)
flooding any two adjacent compartments does not cause any part
of the platform bottom to contact the ocean bottom, and; (3)
flooding of any one compartment does not change the angle of
trim more than one degree.
2.4 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES
The containment assembly consists of four major structures
as shown in Fig. < 2. 5. The assembly includes a concrete con-
tainment shield building , a steel containment shell separated
from the shield building by a 5 foot annulus, a concrete con-
tainment base plate , and the containment interior structure . A
scale drawing provided by the Offshore Power System in way of
the containment vessel is shown in Fig. 2.6.
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Concrete Containment Shield Building
Five Foot Annulus
Steel Containment Shell




FIG. 2.6 SECTIONAL VIEW THROUGH CONTAINMENT
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2.4.1 Containment Shield Buildin^
As with many Westinghouse terrestrial-based plants, the
right circular cylinder containment shield building is a re-
inforced concrete structure. On the 40 foot level of the plat-
form the shield building is attached through steel connectors
encased in the cylindrical concrete wall. Overall dimensions
of the structure include a cylinder diameter of 130 feet, a wall
thickness of 2 feet, and a crown height of I69 feet (above the
40 foot elevation). The 5 foot annular space between the con-
crete shield building and the steel containment shell is for
access and maintenance. Constructed of 4000 psi concrete, the
shield building is reinforced throughout by structural steel
bars.
2.4.2 Containment Shell
The containment shell is a freestanding steel structure
welded at its base to the platform at the 40 foot level. The
shell is 102 feet high with an inside diameter of 120 feet.
Housing the ice condenser and the pressure suppression spray
system, the containment shell is designed to withstand the
pressure resulting from the loss of coolant accident resulting
from a double-ended pipe break. The cylinder, its hemispherical
upper shell top, and the radial stiffening rings are constructed
of SA 516 Grade 60 steel.
2.4.3 Containment Base Plate
The Containment Base plate consists of the upper deck of
the platform at the 40 foot level inside the shield building,
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the bulkhead around the reactor sump, and the innerbottom of
the reactor sump at the 7 1/2 foot level (see again Fig. 2.6).
In the event of the meltdown accident being postulated in this
thesis (Section 1.3) i the base plate forms the final barrier
through which the molten fuel must penetrate prior to con-
tacting the proposed core catcher, if the device is located in
the compartment directly under ' 1he reactor vessel as described in
Section 2.3.
The core catcher proposals discussed in Chapter 1 have been
designed to be located inside this containment base plate; how-
ever, the space under the reactor vessel in a Westinghou.se de-
sign is used to house the in-core instrumentation and is not
available for the core catcher as shown in Fig. 2.7 (Ml, 02).
2,k,k Containment Interior Structure
The containment interior structure provides the pressure
boundary for the ice condenser, provides support for major equip-
ment, and serves as a biological shield. It consists mainly of
concrete structures including a circular crane wall, an operating
deck, a refueling canal with a stainless steel liner, and the
primary biological shield enclosing the reactor vessel.
2.5 ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS
The loss of coolant accident due to a double-ended main
coolant pipe break, assumed by this thesis to ultimately lead
to a core meltdown and pressure vessel meltthrough, is cata-
gorized by the AEC as a "Condition IV" occurence (one which is
not expected to take place but is postulated because its con-
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sequence would include the potential for the release of sig-
nificant quantities of radioactive material) (01). Listed in
Table 2.1 are the so-called Engineered Safety Systems designed
to function only in emergency situations, and in particular,
in the event of a LOCA. This table also shows potential inter-
actions of each safety system with a hypothetical core catcher.
THIS THESIS TACITLY ASSUMES THAT ONE OF THE SYSTEMS (ECCS) FAILS
IN ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION TO REMOVE THE DECAY HEAT FROM THE CORE
FOLLOWING LOCA.
Another engineered system, the breakwater, while not listed
as an Engineered Safety System, provides protection from ship
collisions which could result in sufficient damage to produce
a chain of events leading to a meltdown. Although interviews
with onboard witnesses reveal that there is no danger from shock
damage in a collision (for all ocean collisions of record there
is no evidence of shock-induced failure of piping or machinery)
(W3),
-penetration damage could conceivably rupture the main
coolant piping and render the ECCS inoperable. The breakwater
(estimated for the conceptual design of the offshore plant to
cost $200 million) is therefore designed to prevent any ship
capable of traversing the ocean area in which the plant is
located from penetrating its barrier and reaching the barge (D4).
It may also serve some function in controlling dispersion of
radionuclides released within its confines.
The following is a brief description of each of these sys-





















Essential Service Water 1.
1.
Hydrogen Recombination 1.
Proper operation precludes necess-
ity for catcher.
Can provide 350,000 gallons of wa-
ter for catcher cooling.
System piping, pumps, and heat ex-
changers available for catcher cool-
ing.
Maintains containment pressure £
10 psi by condensing steam evolved
from catcher and from system blow-
down.
Can provide 31^|000 gallons of wa-
ter for catcher cooling.
Maintains containment pressure £
10 psi by condensing steam evolv-
ed from the catcher and from system
blowdown.
Provides either off-barge or diesel
power to drive cooling pumps or
to provide control signals.
Acts as ultimate heat sink for de-
cay heat from the catcher by re-
moving heat from the Containment
Spray heat exchangers.
Vents through filters the airborne
radionuclides entering the 5 foot
annulus between the shield build-
ing and containment shell, mini-
mizing atmospheric radioactive
release.
Forms part of pressure boundary,
along with containment to prevent











Acts as backup to Hydrogen Re-
combination System to allow con-
trolled venting of containment
volume through charcoal filters.
Remove water from catcher com-




2 . 5 • 1 Emergency Gore Cooling; System
Following LOCA, the ECCS provides a means to reflood an
intact reactor vessel and remove the fission product decay
heat to assure core integrity, to maintain the essential core
geometry for heat transfer, and to limit the metal-water reac-
tion rate to that which can be accomodated by the Hydrogen Re-
combination System. In particular, this system is required by
the Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling
Systems (A2) to limit fuel clad temperatures to less than 2300°
F
and to prevent greater than 1% of the zircaloy cladding from
undergoing metal-water reactions with the subsequent production
of excessive hydrogen. A properly functioning ECCS will there-
fore render a core catcher superfluous.
2.5.2 Containment Spray System
The Containment Spray System, together v/ith the Ice Con-
denser Systems, is designed to prevent the maximum pressure in
the containment shell from exceeding 10 psig as the result of
the complete blowdown of coolant through any pipe rupture up
to, and including, the double-ended break. Specifically, the
two systems are designed to remove all stored energy from the
lost coolant, the heat of reaction resulting from a 33$ zircaloy-
water reaction, with the produced hydrogen being burned as it is
released, 5 x 1CT BTU s (about 16% of the coolant stored energy)
of "undefined" energy, and a continuous release, as steam, of
all the core residual heat. The Containment Spray system also
functions to scavenge airborne nuclides, mitigating the con-

52
sequences of vapor release to the atmosphere. The spray water
initially is provided by the Suction Supply System from two
tanks with a usable capacity of 350 , 000 gallons of borated water,
then suction is shifted to the containment sumps to continue
recirculating water from the sumps through the four contain-
spray heat exchangers and back to the containment, followed by
a 75 foot vertical spray fall through the contained space and
finally, drainage back into the sumps. Note that if required
by an actively cooled core catcher this 350 » 000 gallons (4.7 x
10 cubic feet) could easily be made available to the compart-
ment under the reactor vessel by the installation of piping into
that area. Thus, the system's heat exchangers would be used to
remove decay heat from a water cooled crucible containing the
molten or solidified core debris. The four shell-and-tube
heat exchangers are serviced by the Essential Service Raw Water
System, and have a combined capacity of 5.6 x 10' BTU/hr. The
design conditions for the heat exchangers are listed in Table 2.2-.
Table 2.1
DESIGN DATA FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY
HEAT EXCHANGERS
Shell (Raw Water) Tube (Spray Water)
flow, gpm 3000 2400
inlet temp, °F 85 165
outlet temp, °F 123.4 117.2
2.5.3 Ice Condenser System
The Ice Condenser system contains about 2 1/2 million pounds
of ice, sized to provide an energy absorption capacity of twice
the total coolant energy released during blowdown. Completely
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enclosed in an annular compartment located around the perimeter
of the upper containment volume (see Fig. 2.8), the ice bed is
isolated from the containment environment by normally-shut
upper and lower hinged doors which open to expose the ice almost
immediately upon LOGA due to the pressure rise in the asso-
ciated compartment. Note that upon melting, the ice potentially
provides 4.2 x 10 cubic feet (3.14 x 1CK gallons) of water to
cool a core catcher requiring active cooling in conjunction with
the Containment Spray System as described above.
2.5.4 Emergency Power System
In the event of plant trip with the resulting loss of elec-
tric power such as would occur following LOGA, the station
auxiliary transformer remains connected to one shore cable, and
off-site power continues to be available without interruption.
As a backup power source, sufficient self-contained diesel power
is available to power all emergency equipment on the barge.
Provision has therefore already been made in the barge design
for core catcher designs requiring an external source of pump-
ing power to provide cooling water; either presently installed
pumps, such as the containment spray pumps, or a separate set
of core catcher cooling pumps could be sustained by this emer-
gency power.
2.5.5 Essential Service V/ater System
The Essential Service Water System supplies sea water cool-
ing to the Containment Spray System heat exchangers through four
completely independent trains. The four Essential Service water
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pumps are automatically placed on the emergency diesel out-
put in the event of a total loss of off-site power. For a core
catcher design utilizing water cooling, this system could act
as the final heat sink for the fission product decay heat by
pumping the catcher cooling water (with the Containment Spray
Pumps, for example) through the tube side of the Containment
Spray heat exchangers. Recall that these heat exchangers have
7
a combined capacity of 5.6 x 10' 3TU/hr, so that initially, with
o
an assumed fission product decay heat of 1.8 x 10 3TU/hr, some
heat must be removed by other means, perhaps through water evap-
oration and condensation on the steel Containment Shell. The
decay heat value falls to $.6 x 10' BTU/hr in about 2.3 days
after shutdown.
2.^.6 Other Engineered Safety Systems
Several of the Engineered Safety Systems (Annulus Filtration,
Containment Isolation, Hydrogen Recombination, and Containment
Venting) impact the hypothetical core catcher by functioning
as normally designed and are adequately described in Table 2.1
and Ref. 02. All of these systems are important in mitigating
the effects of a reactor core meltdown and preventing a gross
release of fission products to the atmosphere, but none will
be utilized directly by a core catcher design in containing the
molten debris meltdown products. The drain system is included in
this table, although not an Engineered Safety System.
2.6 SUMMARY
The presently envisioned offshore power system has been
described, indicating the systems and containment designed to
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mitigate the effects of LOGA and to prevent core meltdown. The
compartment space available for the location of a potential core
catcher was described; and Table 2.1 reviews possible installed
system interactions with the hypothetical catcher.
The next chapter will describe the postulated core melt-
down accident in a more analytical fashion. Chapter ^ will then
evaluate existing core catcher proposals in view of the specific
offshore plant configuration and their resulting impact upon
it, as inferred from the description presented in this chapter.
Chapter 5 then presents a new core catcher concept, including




ANALYSIS OF THE MELTDOWN ACCIDENT
3.1 FOREWORD
Information introducing the offshore concept and discuss-
ing the need for additional core-meltthrough barriers was pre-
sented in Chapter 1, along with a brief summary of previous
work addressing this problem. Chapter 2 describes in some de-
tail the presently envisioned offshore concept, indicating
potential system interactions with a hypothetical core catcher
device. This chapter, an analytical evaluation of the meltdown
sequence, expands upon the qualitative information presented
in Section 1.3» to develop the quantitative aspects required to
evaluate the capability of a proposed core catcher design. Chap-
ters 4 and 5 will then use this information to assess several
core catcher proposals. Values of the physical parameters used
are given in Appendix A; the nomenclature used is defined in
Appendix B.
3.2 BLOWDOWN
The time required to expel the primary system water from
the reactor vessel, pressurizer, and coolant piping is a direct
function of the driving force, the differential pressure between
the primary system and the containment volume. Initially this
pressure differential will be around 2200 psi, but will decrease
as the containment pressure increases and primary loop pressure
decreases; note that a properly functioning Containment Spray
and Ice Condenser Systems discussed in Chapter 2 will act to

58
suppress the containment pressure, thus enhancing the latter
stages of the blowdown. A minimum blowdown time of $-10 seconds
and a maximum of 30-^5 seconds has been calculated (E3).
At the end of blowdown (25 seconds) approximately 10 fo of
the pressure vessel's initial volume of water remains in the
vessel, and fuel rod temperatures for a typical 1000 MW electric
plant are given by the expression,
T(25)°F = 928(F-0.33) + 5^0°F (3.1)
where F is a local power peaking factor which varies between
O.36 and 2.1; Eq. 3.1 reproduces the TACT computer code results
within - 50°F (M3).
3.3 CORE HEATUP WITHOUT ECCS
The post-shutdown fission product decay heat rate is 6-7%
of the full power rating of the reactor core immediately upon
shutdown, under the conservative assumption of an infinite ir-
radiation time at full power preceeding the shutdown. The
fissioning of fuel nuclei results in the production of many un-
stable nuclei, each of which can undergo an average of five
successive stages of p" decay, producing a new radionuclide at
each step. In all, over 300 nuclides, distributed among many
different chemical species are known or expected to exist after
fission, making calculations involving fission product mixtures
extremely difficult under the most well-defined conditions. The
system of differential equations governing the formation and re-
moval by decay and burnup of radioisotopes in nuclear fuels have
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been programmed for computer calculations and the results re-
ported by Blomeke and Todd in Ref. B3. Since the fission product
concentration, and thus the decay heat generation rate, is a
function of irradiation time and decay time, the authors com-
235
puted the consequences of the thermal fission of U JJ over a
wide range of irradiation and decay times. A variety of useful
data, such as precise fission yield, decay schemes and energies,
cross sections, and fission product concentrations may be deter-
mined from this report.
Although the total beta and gamma decay power as a function
of time after shutdown represents the summation of these com-
plicated decay chains for many different nuclides, the result-
ing energy release can be approximated by relatively simple ana-
lytical expressions. A rather large number of correlations for
the magnitude of the decay heat generation rate exist in the
literature; hence, to promote conservative standardization of
decay heat correlations by vendors, an American Nuclear Society
subcommittee (ANS-5) recommended a standard, which was approved
as the "ANS Standard" in June, 1968 (A2). This ANS Standard
required that the calculations by K. Shure (S3) be used in LOCA
calculations. It should be noted that the principle contri-
bution to the decay heat comes from the decay of U ^ and Np
,
both of which are included in Shure's data. The ANS Standard,
increased by 20^, was accepted by the AEC Regulatory Staff for
use in the "Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Gore Cool-
ing Systems" (A2) as a conservative prescription for the decay
heat source term in LOCA calculations, and it is now used by
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all of the various vendors in their analyses. For order-of-
magnitude analyses, either the Untermeyer-WeilJs correlation
or the Way-Winner correlation, both of which take the form of
simple analytical expressions, is considered sufficiently
accurate for use (C4).
The Shure correlation increased by 20a and now required
by the AEC , makes use of an average value of energy release
during normal power operation of 200 Mev/fission. The decay
heat rate at time ts for a reator which has operated at power




where M = energy decay rate, Mev/fission and
where M(to,ts) = M(c*?,ts) - M(^, to + ts),
and M(co,ts) and M(c^>, to + ts) are
determined from Figs. J.l and 3*2.
Or, conservatively, for an assumed infinite irradiation,
q(watts) = P( «att*0 H(w,,t 8 ) j (3t3)
For infinite irradiation at 3^00 MW thermal and at a blowdown
completion time of 25 seconds, from Fig. 3.1 M(«*>,25) =8.7 Mev/
fission and q(25), the decay heat rate, is 1^7.9 MW, or about
o
5.05 x 10 BTU/hr. At a shutdown time of one hour, M(c*? t 36OO) =
2.6 Mev/fission and q(3600) = kk.Z MW = 1.5 x 10 8 3TU/hr. In-
o
creasing this value by ZOfo results in 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr at the
assumed time of entry of the molten debris into a hypothetical
core catcher device.
For comparative purposes, the Untermeyer-Weills correlation
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or for infinite irradiation,
q (^ t s )
.
= 0.1 (t +10)"0,2 -0.087(t +2xl0 7 )" ' 2 . (3.5)
————————— g 5
^operating
For the same conditions as used in the Shure calculation, the
o
Untermeyer correlation results in values of q(25)=5» 3^x10 BTU/hr
and q(3600)=1.9xl0 8 BTU/hr, slightly higher than the ANS standard.
Finally, the Way-Wigner correlation is given by:
I
°' S
= 0.0622(t "°- 2-(t +t )" - 2 ). (3.6)
qoperating
For infinite operating time this reduces to
q(<*> it
g )
cT~ IT = 0.0622(t )~0,2 . (3.7)
^operating v s KJ '
'
For the example cases at shut down times t = 25 seconds and
o
t * 3600 seconds, this correlation gives q(25) = 3.8 x 10 BTU/
s
hr and q(3600) = 1.4 x 10 8 BTU/hr, slightly lower than the Shure
correlation value.
Assuming an adiabatic heatup model, a total core heat ca-
pacity of 4.07 x 10 BTU/°F for a typical 1000 MWe nuclear plant,
and utilizing the relatively simple Way-Wigner expression, the





x3.^xl0 9 wattsx3.4l2 BTU/hr hr
dt
4.07 x 10^ BTU/°F
watt 3.6xl0^sec / ~ \
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a dT _ ,, Q9„ .-0.2 °F
For "the average core temperature rise (F=1.0) due to decay
heat sources,
dT _ . 7 -0.2 ^F
dt " ^'^ x sec. (3.8c)
As the core temperature rises above about 2300 F, another
heat source, the zircaloy-water reaction, becomes significant,
the reaction rate increasing exponentially with temperature
(Fl). The Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cool-
ing Systems requires the ECCS to limit clad temperatures to less
than 2300°F in order to limit this energy release and to prevent
excessive loss of cladding ductility (A2). Because the reaction
depends upon temperature and upon the amount of water (steam)
available for reaction, the authors of BMI-1910 (M3) have util-
ized a computer code developed for the Brown's Ferry Reactor to
predict the magnitude of this source; the results indicate that
a total of 10$ of the zircaloy will react after 1000 seconds,
the rate remaining fairly constant as the decrease in available
steam counteracts the effect of rising temperature. Thus,
assuming ^,500 lbm of zircaloy and a heat of reaction of
2800 BTU/lbm, the heat generation per second from this source
is,











at k.07 x 10 BTU/°F
The average core temperature following blowdown, at time 25 se-
conds and assuming no heat losses, is then
T(t) = T(25) + Decay Heat + Metal-Water Heat
= Eq. (3.1) + Eq.(3.8b) + Eq(3.10) (3.11)
T(t) = 928(F-0.33)+5^0+6.15F(t 0,8-13.1)+0.307(t-25) (3.12)
A similar analysis in BMI-1910 (M3) resulted in the expression
T(t) = 928(F-0.33)+5^0+8.6F(t0,8
-13.D+0.^8(t-25) (3.13)
which was in substantial agreement with temperatures obtained
from computer codes NURLOC and CHEi-ILOC, leading to the conclu-
sion that the adiabatic model is sufficiently accurate for use.
3.^ CORE COLLAPSE/COLLECTION IN THE REACTOR VESSEL
From Eq. 3.12 the time for the average core (F=1.0) temp-
erature to reach the melting point of zircaloy (3360°F) can be
determined to be around 1300 seconds (21.7 minutes) following
completion of blowdown. For the core hot spots (F=2.1), and
assuming that local maximum temperatures occur at the same points
as local power maxima, the time to reach the zircaloy melting
temperature is 310 seconds (5.2 minutes). The time for the
average core to reach the U02 melting point (5072°F) is about
2500 seconds (^-1.7 minutes), while local rod hot spots will ex-
ceed this temperature in about 8^0 seconds (l^-.O minutes).
The actual mechanism by which the core will fail is not
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known. Failure could occur due to melting of the zircaloy, due
to embrittlement and subsequent fracture of the zircaloy, or
due to melting of the U02 ; however, fuel slumping is most
likely to occur somewhere in the range of temperatures 3300 F
to 5000°F. From Ea . 3.12, the core hot spots (F=2,l) reach
these temperatures in about 5 minutes and 15 minutes respec-
tively, while nearly all regions of the core will have reached
these temperatures and slumped to the lower support plate
forging in 10 minutes to 60 minutes (M3). The authors of
BMI-1910 predict support plate failure at 1300°F in about 30
minutes (a time when about one-half of the core is molten)
allowing the core to fall to the pressure vessel bottom head
area.
As the molten debris falls into the reactor vessel head
area, potential metal-water reactions from two sources could re-
sult in explosions of sufficient energy to rupture the vessel.
The first explosive source, the generation and subsequent rapid
burning of hydrogen from a reduction reaction described by
M + x H
2
> M0X + x H 2 , (3.1*0
has been determined to be an insignificant explosive source;
experimental results indicate the hydrogen generation from molten
U0
2 reacting with water in this fashion is only about 12 ml STP
per gram of U0
2
(G2). The second explosive source is much more
important, and results from rapid flashing and expansion of
water to steam (with the resulting PV work); this is appro-
priately termed a "steam explosion". At the end of blowdown
about 10/o of the original pressure vessel volume of water
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remains in the lower head in the form of a two-phase satu-
rated mixture at the pressure of the containment (A2). As-
suming 10 psig containment pressure (design pressure for the
Offshore Power Systems containment vessel), this implies
several thousand gallons of water at around 2^0 F are available
for a steam explosion reaction.
Although no experimental data is available on the effects
of the interaction between large quantities of molten U0 2 and
water, many industrial and laboratory-simulated explosions in-
volving other molten materials (aluminum, copper, silver, steel)
have occurred. The energy available for the explosion is pri-
marily the sensible heat of the molten material, and if the melt
freezes, the latent heat of fusion of the material is also po-
tentially available. Because of the rapidity of the interaction,
however, experimental work with aluminum has shown that only
the sensible heat of the melt is important, and the latent heat
(and also the sensible heat of the solid) can be neglected in
explosion considerations (W4). Experiments with molten alumi-
num indicate that about 10$ of the total thermal energy avail-
able is converted into high pressure steam, in contrast to only
0.1$ from a thin solid aluminum surface (Fl). Many other ex-
periments and much industrial operating experience support the
observation that multi-thousand pound destructive forces cannot
be generated from solid surfaces interacting with water; appar-
ently the key factor is determining whether the interaction of
hot material with relatively cold liquid will result in de-
structive pressure generation is the rate at which heat is trans-
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ferred—with solids the available heat transfer area is quickly-
blanketed with steam and a protective oxide coating inhibits
the heat transfer. Thus, with molten material, the explosion
process appears to be enhanced through dispersion of the molten
material and the resultant increased heat transfer surface area.
Kazimi, et al., (Kl) have identified four modes of frag-
mentation which facilitate heat transfer to the cold liquid from
the molten material, including: (1) impact fragmentation in
which the metal is dispersed by an external shock source; (2)
entrapment fragmentation in which the material is dispersed by
the rapid vaporization of coolant trapped between the hot molten
matter and a solid surface; (3) hydrodynamic fragmentation in
which non-uniform drag forces around the molten surface exceed
the surface tension, pulling the material apart; and, (^4-) free-
contact fragmentation in which only a small part of the surface
is contacted by the coolant while the rest of the surface is
not wetted and is free to deform. Recognizing the free-contact
mode of fragmentation as the mode most probable in fuel melt-
down for in-vessel considerations, Kazimi has presented a cri-
terion for fragmentation, requiring the melting temperature of
the hot material to be less than the minimum temperature re-
quired to sustain stable film boiling at the surface of the
molten material. Numerically,
T«* >T for fragmentation, where
j
T« = T*T 0,27 % f .afl-^L^f La-V* (3 it)
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and where all values in the expression for T' . are those of
water here assumed saturated at 2^0 F. By inserting the appro-
priate physical property values from Appendix A and Ref . K2,
(32,2)(59. 2-0. 6)]
f




= 2k0 + 0-^7 (0,o^952)
= 2^0.11°F
59.2 + 0.06 Jg_9.2-t-0.06j j(32.2)(59)j
T* = 2^0.11 + (0.11)(0.46) (59. 1*0(0. 39)1 9 52,0
= 26^.95°F L\)(600)(2.6)(0.l) (0.1)(0.11)J
Therefore, one finds that T* <T (U0
2 ),
and thus that this mode
of fragmentation and area enhancement is not expected. Similar
results are obtained for molten zircaloy and steel in water.
As an aside, it should be noted that this phenomena is expected
to occur in LMFBR's where the liquid coolant has a boiling point
(T ,) of around 1600°F at atmospheric pressure, resulting in
V> Tm(UV-
Although the steam generation process and possible subse-
quent explosion is not expected to be enhanced by fragmentation,
sufficient energy (depending upon the quantity of water remain-
ing in the reactor vessel and the method of entry of the molten
debris into the water —either ''dribbling" in or in a large
mass) may exist to result in a large amount of steam generation
and PV-type work. It should be noted that 1 lbm of water heated
from saturated liquid to saturated vapor at 2^0 F results in an
enthalpy change of 952 BTU'sj Ref. M3 equates 1600 BTU • s to
1 pound of TNT in destructive potential—thus 1 lbm of water
totally vaporized could then yield an explosion equivalent to
0.6 pound TNT. Several uncertainties, besides the obvious con-
cern over steam explosions, involved in this stage of the a.naly-
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sis were pointed out in Chapter 1. The description of the
meltthrough chain of events will continue, assuming no steam
explosion occurs at this point.
3.5 REACTOR VESSEL MELTTHROUGH
At this point in the accident the entire 3^00 MW thermal
core is assumed to have collected on the reactor vessel bottom
head. If the core has crumbled to the bottom in a nonnrolten
state due to loss of clad integrity, calculations in BMI-1861
indicate that the mass may be coolable, given a means for
adequate recirculation of coolant water. For molten cores,
analyses by Phillips Petroleum Company personnel and by L.S.
Tong (T2) indicate meltthrough may be stopped in-vessel under
certain circumstances. The Phillips results, however, assume
the molten core can be cooled to 250 F by dropping it through
pressure vessel water, and even given this doubtful accomplish-
ment, the results show meltthrough will occur if greater than
25$ of the core melts (M3). Analyzing the asymptotic , or steady
state, situation, Tong assumes the entire reactor vessel will
be submerged in water or cooled by spray and then relies on a
boiling-condensing cycle of steel to cool the debris; however, a
detailed analysis of Tong's work indicates that less than 1/V'
of reactor vessel bottom head thickness will be under 800 F, and
the vessel will lack the structural strength required to support
the molten mass (F3).
From data given in Appendix A for the volume and area of
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the lower head, an equivalent hemisphere of diameter Ik feet
may be assumed. Complete core meltdown of 218,000 pounds of
U0 2 and 4^,500 lbs of zircaloy v/ould occupy about ^J-73 cubic
feet of the bottom volume. From the equation for the volume
and surface area of a segment of a sphere of radius R (=?feet)
(CI),
V - l/3TTh 2 (3R-h) (3.17)
A = 2nrh (3-18)
pne can determine that a complete core meltdown would deposit
debris of depth, h, 5«38 feet onto the hemispherical bottom, re-
sulting in a heat transfer area of 236.6 square feet. Assuming
an equivalent semi-infinite slab geometry of the same area, the
describing differential equation is
Si ^x z , (3.19)
where c< = k/ c
p
=
T (x)~ T initial
T Tinterface - initial
X = distance into pressure vessel
For the idealized case of a semi-infinite solid initially at a
uniform temperature of T. ... , (2^0 F for the pressure vessel)r initial *
suddenly exposed at its surface to a fluid at constant temper-
atures, Tf , . , (6000 F boiling point of U0p), and a constant





rfC 2^ -^ + (W?)rfilk + %S\ (3.20)
init fluid
Solutions of Eq. 3.20 are plotted in Fig. 3.3 (fl2). The approp-
riate value for the heat transfer coefficient is questionable;
several reports (E3,Z1) have modeled the pressure vessel and core
catcher sacrificial material meltthrough as a pure conduction
problem, while the authors of BMI-1910 (M3) advocate use of the
following correlation from Ref. M4 describing the cooling of a
hot liquid by a cold plate facing downward t
Nu = 0.14 (Gr Pr) 1/? (3.21)
Recognizing the meltthrough situation to be one in which the
molten matter is cooled at the bottom by virtue of melting the
pressure vessel, BMI-1910 recommends using one-half the value
of h obtained from this correlation? justification for this re-
commendation is given by comparing the resulting h with that ob-
tained by Fontana (F2)—however, Fontana also considered a
situation involving top surface cooling. As the molten material
melts into the pressure vessel head, because of the curvature
of the vessel some of the fuel will be cooled on the head at
heights above other portions which have not yet begun to cool.
Natural convection Benard cells (M4) will thus be established,
and the debris will cool by convective heat transfer. Utili-
zing the molten U0
2
properties from Appendix A, Eg. 3.21 results
in a value of h equal to about I36O BTU/hr-Ft -F; taking one-
half this value as recommended by the authors of BMI-1910 re-
sults in h=680 BTU/hr-Ft 2-F. A pure conduction model in which
it is assumed that the molten U0 2 sinks by displacing the
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FIG. 3.3 TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE HISTORY








freshly melted steel reactor vessel material has been utilized
by Zivi (Zl) in analyzing his core catcher proposal; the pure
conduction model corresponds to a convective model with a value
of h of around 50 BTU/hr-Ft 2-F. Solving Eq. 3.20 for the time,
t, required for the melting front (T=T , steel) to reach point
x (the reactor vessel thickness) and applying these values of
the heat transfer coefficient to Eq. 3«20 results in meltthrough
/ 2 o
times of around 5 hours for an assumed h of 50 BTU/hr-Ft -F and
2.62 hours for an h of 680 BTU/hr-Ft 2 -F. In the limit, for a
perfectly conducting situation (h= c^> ), the second term in Eq.
3.20 goes to zero, and one obtains
T-Tinitial
= erfc
Tfluid-Tinitial ~ Z^ (3.22)
from which
erf
z Jk-% - °-58
and t = 2.35 hours.
All these values overestimate the actual time required to melt-
through the pressure vessel, and, as such, are not conservative
in terms of core catcher design. The overestiraation occurs be-
cause in the actual case, the vessel material at its outside
surface must transfer heat by radiation or natural convection
to the containment air, while it has been assumed here that the
vessel is semi-infinite in the x direction, thus, permitting
transfer of heat by conduction through the steel at the vessel
external boundary.
A more conservative time estimate is obtained by first
writing a heat balance on the debris as
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If it is assumed the debris reaches the pressure vessel bottom
30 minutes after blowdown at the UOp boiling point of 6000°F,
dTtt 1 and any excess heat generated (over that conducted to the
pressure vessel) will either vaporize the debris, increasing the
volume rate of vaporization term (V ), or increase the surface
rate of radiative heat flux, q". . The heat transferred to
^ top
the vessel, hA ( Tme T+~Tm vessel^' mus * firs
'
fc raise the vessel
temperature from an assumed 240 F to its melting point and then
melt the steel. Thus,
hA (T -T )=22£ a 0(n (m _»p \v melt m, vessel dt bottom^ p m, vessel o, vessel
+ A f,vessel>' (3.24)
.
XA? (C (T -T )+A F ) o it\or t= ' x p m o 7 *' , (3.25)
hA (T ,,-T )
melt m
It is noted that Eqs. 3.24 and 3.25 assume no heat is conducted
away from the reactor pressure vessel bottom head into the other
parts of the reactor vessel. Thus, the times for meltthrough
calculated in this manner are conservative, assuming an adia-
batic interaction between the core debris and the bottom head
portion of the vessel only. Using values for the carbon steel
vessel from Appendix A and for a vessel thickness of 14 inches,
the time required for meltthrough is about 1.4 hours for an
assumed h of 50 BTU/hr-Ft ^F and 0.1 hour for a heat transfer
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coefficient of 680 3TU/hr-Ft 2-F (M3). The rate of heat trans-
ferred in either case is
q
= KA < Tdebri8-V- (3 - 26)
Using the total area covered by the debris of 236.6 square feet
o
as calculated above, the heat transfer rate is 0.4 x 1(T 3TU/hr
for K=50 BTU/hr-Ft 2-F and 5.4 x 10 8 BTU/hr for h=680 BTU/hr-Ft 2-^.
The ANS Standard (Fig. 3.1) predicts a decay heat value of
o
1.86 x 10 BTU/hr 30 minutes after shutdown. Although the heat
removal for an assumed heat transfer coefficient of 680 3TU/hr-
FT -?F exceeds the decay heat, the assumption that the debris
temperature remains at 6000 F is still reasonable since this
removal rate only occurs for 0.1 hour and since a decreased
debris temperature also decreases the heat removal rate, while
the heat generation rate remains constant.
3.6 CONTAINMENT MELTTHR0UGH
As indicated in Chapter 2, the last significant barrier
to the molten debris in its downward path on the presently con-
figured floating plant is the approximately 3 foot thick con-
crete containment base plate under the in-core instrumentation
keyway (see again Figs. 2.5 and 2.6).
A detailed analysis of the decomposition of concrete may
be found in Ref. Rl ; Table 3.1 contains a summary of data ger-





1. Composition of Concrete (weight %)
CaCO~ 60fo
n 9 * 20%
Si0 2 20%
2. Disintegration Temperature 900 F
3. Melting Temperatures
SiO P 3100°F
CaO^(From CaCOj 4400 F
4. Heat of Decomposition:
to heat to 4500°F and melt Si0
2
and CaO 2.05MW-sec/lbm con-
crete
to heat to 3100°F and melt Si0
2 1.35
to heat to 2200°F and spall concrete 1.10
5. C0 2 production 325 Ft^ COg/Ft^ concrete
Concrete is reported to partially disintegrate at about 900°F,
but to maintain its retention properties until the CaCO-. (lime-
stone) begins decomposing between 1600 F and 2000 F to yield
C0 2 . At this point, because the density of the concrete par-
ticles is much lower than the molten fuel, particles of concrete,
C0
2 , and water vapor will rise rapidly through the liquid, either
dissolving in the molten mass or forming a top layer. The sur-
face of the concrete will spall and fragment continuously,
exposing new concrete through the resulting churning process.
Because of the low thermal conductivity of concrete
(k=0.64 BTU/hr-Ft-F), the process of heat transfer between the
molten debris and the concrete pad of the Containment Base
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Plate (circle of diameter Ik feet) will very nearly be an
adiabatic process; that is, very little heat v/ill be conducted
from the horizontal pad to the vertical concrete walls of the
keyway. The total mass of concrete in the 3 foot pad is
M = ? Volume, (3.27a)
= ) TT D (thickness) /~ 07b)
= 6A6 x 10^ lbm.
Using the heat of decomposition associated with raising the
temperature of the concrete to 2200 P, H=l.l
^^ concrete
3
(=1.04x BTU/lbm concrete), and the decay heat rate value at
o
one hour (1.8 x 10 BTU/hr), the time to "meltthrough" the con-
crete is determined:
-
1»0^ x 10 3BTU/lbm x 6.k6 x lO^lbmt=
1;8xl08BT£ (3.28)
=0.37 hours.
If all the contained limestone decomposes to COp, a total of
v 325 Ft





= s x Zp (3.29)
Ft^ concrete
= 1.5 x 10 5 Ft 3 co 2
f> ?
will be generated. For a total containment volume of 1.25x10 Ft
,
this amount of C0 2 represents about 12$ of the total volume,





This chapter has described in some detail the anticipated
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sequence of events involved in reactor core meltdown. The
following chapter will utilize this information, together with
the offshore plant characteristics, to evaluate the feasibility
of employing existing core catcher proposals on the barge system.
A conservative interpretation of the results of this chap-
ter indicate that a proposed core catcher must be capable of
assimilating about 250 tons of molten debris, potentially at
the boiling point of U0 2 (6000 F), as soon as one hour after
blowdown. The decay heat rate at this time, determined using
o
the ANS Standard, is 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr, assuming no loss of




ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS PROPOSALS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Several core catcher concepts were introduced in Section
1.4. The presently conceived offshore, barge -mounted plant
was described in Chapter 2, with particular emphasis on those
systems and features related to the design and function of an
installed core catcher, and the area and volume available for
the core catcher design. The hypothetical core meltdown acci-
dent was then described in Chapter 3t indicating magnitudes
of the decay heat rate to be accomodated, times of interaction,
and an approximate sequence of events in the accident. In the
present chapter previous core catcher proposals will be eval-
uated to assess their adaptability to
A
offshore plant design of
Chapter 2.
4.2 ZIVI SACRIFICIAL U0
2
CONCEPT
In references Zl and Z2 Zivi describes a "completely
passive" barrier to penetration of the molten mass through the
containment vessel. In neither reference is the total amount
of U0
2 necessary to stop the meltthrough for all time calcula-
ted, nor is the U0
2
surface area required to remove the decay
heat considered. Zivi analyzes two possible occurrences: first
the case of the molten core floating on the sacrificial U0 ? layer,
with no penetration; and then the more severe case of the molten





Recognizing the thermal properties of U0
2
to be nearly the
same in the solid and liquid states, Zivi models the case of
the molten core floating on the sacrificial UOp as a semi-
infinite slab having a sudden imposition of a temperature equal
to the U0 2 boiling temperature on its surface. In this assumed
situation the heat must be conducted through the previously melt-
ed sacrificial U0 ? to reach fresh (non-molten) UOp, and the
analysis results in a melting front penetration rate of 20










= U0 2 boilinS temperature, 6000°F
T = initial sacrificial UOp temperature, 80°F
T
(x) = sacrificial temperature at distance x from surface.
Under the initial and boundary conditions
= all x, t *
0=1 x=0, t >
Q = x=oo , t > ,
this equation has as its solution (Bl),
8 = 1 - erf "L~ , (4.3)
/4<* t





Inserting the appropriate properties of U0
? from Appendix A,
k / 2
one obtains a heat flux of 3.5 x 10 BTU/hr-ft , requiring
(at a time of 1 hour) a surface area of about 5*^3 square feet
o
to remove the decay heat at a rate of 1,8 x 10 BTU/hr (calculat-
ed from the ANS Standard + 20% in Chapter 1). This required
area greatly exceeds the available compartment deck area under
the reactor vessel and bounded by bulkheads 3 and k and F and G
(see again Fig. 2.4), which totals 177^.25 square feet. A
similar magnitude of required surface area is obtained for the
case in which the molten core is assumed to displace the sac-
rificial UOp.
Arnold (Al) has determined the total fission product decay
heat released from a 3200 MWt core following infinite irrad-
iation to be 9 x 10 7 MW-sec or about 8.53 x 10 10 BTU. Fig. *K1
illustrates the decay heat rate as a function of time after
shutdown, and Fig. k.2 shows the integral of this rate over
time—the total energy released as a function of time. To absorb
this heat completely by melting sacrificial U0 2 would require
MU0 {Cp
(T
m~ V + V = 8 ' 53 x 10±0 BTU » (4 ' 5)
from which a total required mass of 70,000 tons of sacrificial
U0p can be determined. This represents 37% of the total barge
displacement as now envisioned. In addition to being completely
cost prohibitive (about £10^ at current U02 prices), this quan-
tity of UOp v/ould require a complete re-design of the barge
system.
It is not clear exactly what is being proposed by Zivi.
Although utilizing the term "completely passive" in describing
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his concept, he further states that this core catcher will
detain the mass sufficiently long to prevent containment melt-
through assuming "the heat generated by the fission products
is removed from the containment vessel by a cooling system".
Thus, the "completely passive system" still requires some form
of active cooling to be economically and technically feasible,
and this method is seen to be merely a variation of the concept
proposed for Indian Point 2 (M3). As a completely passive sys-
tem, the Zivi U0 2 sacrificial method is judged untenable for any
use, but particularly unsuitable for barge use.
4.3 DOAN-CROWLEY LEAD SLURRY CONCEPT
This method closely parallels that of Zivi, as pointed
out in Chapter 1 ; Doan and Crowley, however, recognize the
impracticality of attempting to assimilate all the fission
product decay heat by sacrificial melting, and require massive
heat sinks in the form of water-cooled radiators to remove this
.energy. In Ref. D2, an iterative process is used to determine
the mass of lead (M,) and radiative surface area (A) required
to establish equilibrium at timel" after LOCA for a given
emissivity of lead ( e ). The lead pool is assumed to be at its
boiling point (T ,), radiating to exposed radiator surfaces
v, x
at temperature (T ), at a rate equal to the decay heat rate q(t')
a
at time t as given by the Untermeyer-Weills decay heat correlation.
Thus at equilibrium time t t
q( t) =<TeA(T^ , - A . (4.6)V , J. a.
No credit is taken for any heat radiated until time'i' , so that
all decay energy released and the sensible heat of the U0 2






u02Cp(U02 (T0|U0- Tv<1 ) =
MlGp,l (Tv.l-To,l) +M 1 • <*•?>
where, TQ UQ = initial U0 2 temperature
T , = initial lead temperature.
Assuming the crucible to be built in the shape of a truncated
cone, the authors found that for a top surface area (A) of 529
square feet, 8760 metric tons of lead and a crucible height of
72 feet (with a top surface to bottom surface ratio of 0.5)
would be required; this size crucible is obviously unsuitable
for barge use. However, for a top surface area of IO89 square
feet, only 850 metric tons of lead and a cruciMe height of 3.6
feet are required. However, this assumes a lead-UOp equil-
ibrium temperature of T ,(3158.6 F), well below the freezing
V, -L
point of U0
? (5072 F), without including, as a heat source, the
latent heat of fusion of the UO^. This additional energy is
For 100 metric tons of UOp the additional energy to be absorbed
by the lead is 2.38 x 10' BTU, and the additional lead required
p,l v v,l o,l y
= 8^.6 metric tons
for an assumed initial lead temperature of 80°F. Additionally,
as shown in Chapter 3> one should expect another 100-150 tons
of structural metal to accompany the U0 2 fuel into the core
catcher, possessing both sensible heat and heat of fusion which
must be accomated by the lead. Therefore, it is seen that the
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calculations in Ref. D2 result in a lov/er lead mass and core
catcher height than would actually be required under completely
conservative assumptions.
The calculations in Ref. D2 further assume perfect emission
with no reflection back into the lead pool. For a given mass
of lead, Doan and Crowley determine that 23 metric tons of lead
per hour must be vaporized to accomodate a 10$ reduction in
radiant heat transfer. If the radiators were to utilize nat-
ural convection by boiling and exhausting at atmospheric pressure 8
the maximum heat flux that could be accomodated prior to reaching
critical heat flux (CHF) is around 200,000 BTU/hr-ft 2 (El), re-
quiring a total radiator heat transfer area of around 750 square
feet. For the radiators to have this large surface area, be
located such that the radiation heat transfer is effective, be
protected from the core debris when it falls, and still be loc-
ated in the space available on the present barge design would
be extremely difficult, especially when it is noted that the
crucible requiring 850 metric tons of lead (Ref. D2 calculation)
occupies over 60% of the available compartment deck area under
the reactor vessel of 177^»25 square feet. Trying to compromise
on upper pool surface area was shown previously to rapidly in-
crease the quantity of lead required.
Finally, the cost of this design, while relatively inex-
pensive considering only the lead cost ($281,000 for 850 tons
(D2)), must also include the unknown cost of the research and
development, and then the design and manufacture, of the rad-
iators and their associated piping. Total costing estimates
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therefore cannot be made.
In summary, because of the uncertainty involved in the
design and operation of the radiative heat transfer system,
the difficulty of incorporating the system components into
the available space, and the uncertainty of exactly how much
lead is required, this proposal is judged non-ideal for barge
use.
4.^ INDIAN POINT 2 CONCEPT
One of the first proposed solutions to the containment
meltthrough problem, this method as submitted required water
flooding to a height of 28 feet above the ceramic-lined crucible
bottom. As shown in Chapter 2, the volume under the present
reactor pressure vessel and inside the containment is now
occupied by in-core instrumentation leads, and use of this
space for a core catcher is not deemed feasible. The concept
could be adapted to the open space below the containment, al-
though the flooding height would be limited to 7.5 feet.
This proposal has been extensively analyzed by Refs. E3
and M3. The Ergen Report (E3) applies a conductive heat trans-
fer model to the concept by assuming that a central plane
exists in the molten debris which will heat to the vaporization
temperature of UO^. Assuming water cooling on the top of the
debris pool and on the bottom of the crucible, the author con-
cludes that equilibrium would be established in 30 minutes to
90 minutes with no significant refractory melting, and thus
concludes that one should design for the steady state case.
At the central plane, T = T TTr. , x = 0, and 4" = °, while atVfUu^ ox
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the refractory surface, T=T and x=L. The one-dimensional,
m , MgO
steady-state heat transfer equation for constant thermal con-
ductivity, k„Q , is given by
k d
2
T = -q" '. (4.10)
dx?
Integrating once, one obtains
&1 = -C ' ' x + G 1 , (4.11)
dx k









and at x = L, T(x) = T .. n , such thatm,MgO





















Finally, the heat flux to the crucible is given by
= q' • 'L (from Eq. ^.11)
= (2kfl ,,,(Tv,U0
2
- ^m.MgO^^ ™ Eq - *•«) ^• 1 7)
Results obtained for assumed values of the parameters are
given in Table 4.1. Note from this table that if no top sur-
face cooling is provided, an area of 3422 square feet is requir-
es
ed to remove the decay heat rate of 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr at one





TID-24226 RESULTS FOR MgO CRUCIBLE
Parameters:
q'", BTU/ft 3 -hr 300,000














steel crucible thickness, in 1.0
Results:
q", BTU/hr-ft 2 52,600
MgO thichness, in 2.7
max steel temp, F 660
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As pointed out in Chapter 3i the authors of BMI-1910 (M3)
take issue with this purely conductive model, promoting a
convective heat transfer mechanism with values of the heat
transfer coefficient as large as 685 BTU/hr-ft- F, and thus
predicting a crucible meltthrough in many cases. Additionally,
although pure UOp has a higher melting point than MgO, and
therefore appears to be a better liner candidate than MgO,
a possible peritectb isaction between UOp and iron is reported
in BMI-1910 which reduces the effective melting temperature of
the UOp surface to 2800 F. Similarly, the debris melting
point could be reduced to 2800 F by the reaction of core U0
?
and pressure vessel steel.
The required thickness of the refractory liner is deter-
mined by several, often conflicting, considerations; the liner
must be thick enough to protect the steel crucible from melting,
thin enough to allow for sufficient bottomside heat transfer,
thick enough to prevent exceeding the critical heat flux at
the bottom surface, and thick enough to withstand a potentially
large mechanical shock as the core materials fall into the
catcher. The thickness of a UOp refractory which can be melted
is determined in 3MI-1910 in a manner similar to the pressure
vessel meltthrough discussion in Chapter 3« Starting from an
initial debris boiling temperature, a heat balance on the debris
gives:
q. = q A + hA(T-T ) + (JCLA) , . . ~ (4.18)Hdecay Ho v m 'debnsdt
where qQ = top surface heat flux (0<qQ< 360,000)
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T = debris and refractory melting point (2000<T < 51 50)
L = thickness of the debris
A = surface area
dT
It is noted that -rr must be either zero or negative; a positive
value would indicate debris evaporation and not a temperature
rise. Thus, the debris is either cooled or evaporates, depend-
ing upon values assumed for the surface heat removal rate, the
debris and refractory melting point, and the convective heat
transfer coefficient, h. Note that increasing the assumed
value of h cools the debris faster, but also results in a
higher rate of refractory penetration. Results in BMI-1910
dTindicate that the debris will cool (^r < 0) for a slab diameter
greater than 22 feet regardless of the value of h and T
, if
cooling at the top surface (q ) is available at 360,000 BTU/hr-ft
(assumed CHF for atmospheric pool boiling of water). Even with
this same value of q , for a diameter less than 15 feet the
debris will continue to boil and the core catcher melt, if T
m




dTFor the case -rr > 0, a constant heat flux into the refractory
will exist, and the thickness penetrated will be linearly pro-
dTportional to time; if xr^O* the debris cools, and the penetra-
tion rate decreases with time until q A is equal to the decay
heat source, and the excess sensible debris heat is consumed by
the melting process. For the worst case of q* * y. ++ orn = 0,
all the heat transferred to the refractory at the rate hA(T-T ),





If the debris does not cool, T remains at T TTn , and thev,uu
2
authors of BMI-1910 display plots showing depths of U02 melted
versus time for varying values of the input parameter, h. For
extreme values of h (500 BTU/hr-ft 2-°F and 10 BTU/hr-ft 2-°F)
,
the analysis indicates that over 1^ feet of UOp per day and
about 1 foot of U0 2 per day, respectively, will melt. Again,
it is noted that this assumes that a topside cooling rate equiv-
alent to the decay heat source rate is available; for atmos-
pheric pool boiling, El-Wakil (E3) references a CHF of 200,000
BTU/hr-ft - F, requiring a 900 square foot top surface area to
remove 1.8 x 10 8 BTU/hr.
If the debris does cool, Eqs. ^.18 and ^.19 are solved to









m " V + \
From this expression one can see that a melting depth equili-
brium is reached which is independent of the assumed value of
h, the heat transfer coefficient; the rate of penetration is
determined by this value, but the rate is slow enough not to be
of particular importance. The equilibrium depth for a U02
refractory is b.b inches for an assumed T of 5150 F (no lower-
m
ing of T due to potential metallurgical combinations) and Jl,k
inches for a T of 2800°F.
m
The authors of BMI-1910 conclude that there is insufficient
knowledge of metallurgical, thermophysical, and heat-transfer
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characteristics available to state with certainty that a thin
ceramic-lined core catcher will work, and that, in fact, a con-
servative analysis concludes that molten cores cannot be contain-
ed in this manner. Wore importantly, the possibility of steam
explosions and hydrogen generation from metal-water reactions
must be considered (F3). This concept requires dropping the
molten material directly into a pool of water, and as shown in
Chapter 3» the resulting rapid generation of steam and its
subsequent expansion could badly damage both the crucible and
the barge structures. Additionally, even though the water
surrounding the crucible has been shown to be effective in
removing the decay heat for reasonable surface areas (and
assuming no steam explosions), the absorbed heat must still be
transferred from the water inside the barge to the environment.
If a direct path exists from the space below the reactor vessel
to the containment volume (see again Fig. 2.&), the installed
ice condensers and containment spray system could be utilized
as a heat sink; if not, additional barge modifications are
required. Therefore, although the concept can be shown to stop
the molten material, the possibility of a steam explosion (even
without fragmentation leading to an area enhancement) is con-
sidered too risky to deem the concept advisable for implemen-
tation on a floating plant.
4.5 TONG IN-VESSEL CONCEPT
As previously described in Chapter 1, Tong considered the
asymptotic post-meltdown configuration and demonstrated that by
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totally submerging the reactor vessel in water, or by contin-
uously spraying the vessel surfaces with water, the core could
be retained on the vessel bottom head. His example (T2) for
a 3000 MV/t reactor requires a heat flux of 300,000 3TU/hr-ft 2
over sections of the bare vessel to absorb the one-hour decay
heat rate.
However, the present V/estinghouse reactor vessels, as
described in Ref. 02, are permanently insulated on the cylin-
drical portion of the vessel below the refueling ledge with a
reflective type insulation supported from the coolant nozzles 4
,
the vessel upper and lower heads are likewise insulated, but
with removable insulation panels. The insulation consists of
inner and outer sheets of type 30k stainless steel spaced a
minimum of 3 inches apart with multilayer stainless steel foil
as an insulating agent to prevent excessive heat loss from
the vessel, as well as excessive thermal stress due to temper-
ature gradients. Achievement of the heat flux magnitude of
300,000 BTU/hr-ft (CHF) required for this concept is prevented
by the presence of this insulation. The concept described in
Ref. T2 should thus only be considered for bare reactor vessels.
Another heat transfer mechanism relied upon in this concept is
the boiling and condensing of steel inside the reactor vessel.
There is no assurance that this cycle can occur, however, and
that the steel will not plate out on the surfaces of the
vessel, thereby stopping the cycle.
Although this concept is attractive because of its relative
simplicity and low cost, it is not considered feasible in terms
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of providing positive insurance against fission product release
to the environment.
4.6 BMI-1910 SPREADER CONCEPT
While not presented in Ref. M3 as a specific design, the
concept of spreading the debris to allow for more efficient
cooling and resolidification is intuitively attractive. Several
problem areas are discussed in the proposal including: (1) large
diameter slabs are required to avoid the long term presence of
molten U0
? ; (2) the debris may "dam" due to crust formation and
not spread; and, (3) the possibility of steam explosions again
exists. The type of crucible employed to hold the debris is
not discussed.
Assuming steady-state conductive heat transfer in the slab
and v/ater cooling on one side of the slab, the resulting slab
size required for resolidification is plotted in BMI-1910 versus
center plane temperature, to allow a range of assumed solidify-
ing temperatures to be checked. For an assumed T , , . of
5072 F, the required slab diameter is around 60 feet, and the
thickness is limited to about 2.5 inches, assuming no volatile
fission product loss from the slab; if the decay heat rate is
assumed reduced by one-half due to the loss of volatile fission
products, a diameter of about 47 feet is required.
The concept of spreading the core to increase heat transfer
is acceptable for barge use. Because of the magnitude of the
required diameters, a pure spreading design utilizing only top
surface water cooling is not acceptable; however, if employed
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as an integral precept of a design utilizing more (or better)
heat transfer mechanisms, spreading the debris is a useful
proposal.
4.7 WEST-FLETCHER WATER-COOLED CRUCIBLE
The primary innovation of this patented invention is the
use of water filled tubes actuated automatically and depending
only upon gravity induced flow and natural convection for proper
operation. By removing free water from the crucible, the steam
explosion problem is circumvented, and by removing the
dependency upon external power or signals, the concept is truely
passive, requiring no external action for its operation.
In the preliminary discription of the invention, the
authors rely on gravity and the low viscosity of the U0
2
to
spread the molten debris over the crucible surface. However,
as indicated in the BMI-1910 Spreader Concept, a dam of solid
debris could form to prevent complete dispersal. A variation
suggested in the patent disclosure to provide a layer of lead
on top of the tubes, could help to ensure spreading over the
surface.
Insufficient information is provided in the actual dis-
closure of the invention for a detailed analysis of the specific
concept: no dimensions, materials, flow rates, or other pertin-
ent data are discussed. The concept of the invention, shown in
Fig. 4.3, is adaptable in principle to barge use. A straight
run of pipe opening to the sea at the 1 elevation of the barge
(32 foot submergence depth) could replace the reservoir shown
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. 3 • The inlet pipe could then feed an inlet plenum as
described in this invention, which in turn could supply water
to the multi-tube crucible, terminating in an outlet plenum
and outlet standpipe, sized to minimize the resistance to steam
flow out of the crucible, and extending above the water surface.
If desired, the piping could be isolated from sea pressure
during normal operation by including remotely operated gate
valves in the line? however, this would require an operator or
sensing-device action to initiate the flow, removing a degree
of passiveness from the concept. Assuming the sea water is
heated to saturation (100^ quality) at 20 psia in the crucible
by the decay heat source, an order-of-magnitude estimate of the
required mass flow rate may be determined by an application of
the steady-flow energy equation (see Fig. ^.^),
The actual velocities, V. and V 2 , must be determined by an it-
erative process, considering the net driving head, the two-phase
friction and acceleration losses, and the pipe sizes; however,
it has been shown that the velocity head and elevation head
are both negligible compared to the energy manifested in the
enthalpy change. Thus, for a conservative, order-of-magnitude
approximation to the mass flow rate required, Eq. ^-.23 reduces to
q = m (h2 - h 1 ) , (^.24)
and, ft = 1.6 x 1CK lbm/hr, for the decay heat rate value at one
o
hour after shutdown (1.8 x 10 BTU/hr) and for the sea water
conditions discussed above and illustrated in Fig. k.k.
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**w = 1156.4 BTU/11




The driving head available will depend upon the average
density in the outlet leg, hwjm , and is given by
^ pdriving head 'water " ' steanr g \ * d)
For order-of-magnitude considerations, assume Jsr^n is again the
density of saturated steam at 20 psia, yielding
AD, . . . . = (62.3 - 0.05) 32 = 13.8 psi.^
^driving head x -* •" •* J F
It is seen that because of the relative magnitude of the density
of the water and steam, the driving head will essentially be
equal to the head of water on the inlet pipe, and the column of
steam can be neglected.
An inherent risk involved in this design is the potential
meltthrough of one of the crucible tubes resulting in the possible
release of fission products to the environment via the outlet
steam pipe. Uncertainties which could lead to a tube melt-
through include uneven debris spreading, with a resultant ex-
cessive heat flux over a particular pipe section, decreased flow
due to fouling of a tube, flow maldistribution due to pressure
pulses, and unequal composition or concentration of the fission
products within the debris, again resulting in excessive heat
flux over effected areas. From the Naval Architect's viewpoint,
every additional pipe subjected to submergence pressure represents
a potential flooding casualty from sea chest failure, joint
failure, or pipe rupture. Therefore, although this method
provides a passive means for obtaining cooling water, a varia-
tion which could circumvent the risks of internal flooding and
fission product release, while avoiding the complexity in the
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form of a welded bed of piping, should be considered.
By utilizing the installed Containment Spray System as a
condenser and the water from the primary coolant system and
spray systems, no piping external to the barge hull would be
required. A steam flow path will either exist naturally from
the space beneath the reactor vessel up through the vessel and
into the containment volume via the pipe rupture which initiated
LOCA, or could easily be provided with internal ducting. The
return path for cooled water into the crucible space could
likewise be provided by internal piping, or natural gravity
drain from the containment volume. Since it has been shown in
Section k-,2 that some form of external cooling is required for
a feasible core catcher, a modified West-Fletcher concept of a
natural convection/gravity flow system may be utilized on the
barge-mounted plant.
4XJANSSN COMBINATION CATCHER CONCEPT
As indicated in Chapter 1, Jansen has employed several
concepts in his fast reactor core catcher proposal (J3). To
disperse the molten core over a large area, preventing recom-
bination into a critical mass and diluting the volumetric heat
source, a ceramic oxide (preferably basalt), with a low melting
point and in which the fuel is soluble, forms the first layer
in the catcher. The maximum temperature in the system is then
lowered as the fuel temperature is reduced to the ceramic
melting point through the absorption of the generated heat into
the latent heat of fusion of the ceramic, assuming sufficient
ceramic is provided. By spreading the resulting fluid mass, an
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increased heat transfer area for convection and radiation is
obtained. Next, a layer of U0
2
is employed as a slow-melting
protective barrier, as discussed in the Zivi proposal. Fire
bricks or other insulating material then protect the steel
crucible (or the steel containment vessel) against excessive
temperatures. Finally, heat is removed from the containment
vessel by cooling water passing through pipes embedded in the
structural concrete of the vessel wall, although the patent
disclosure states that the cooling pipes could be eliminated if
the containment vessel could be made "larger". No supplementary
method of heat removal is discussed if the pipes are removed,
so again reliance is placed upon the gradual melting of the
sacrificial U0 ? and radiation for decay heat removal.
For an assumed 500 MWt fast reactor core, calculations
described in the patent (J3) indicated that for a four-foot
layer of basalt brick, a four-foot layer of fire brick, and
cooling pipes maintained at.150.8 F, the pool reaches a maximum
temperature of 2588°F, 65 hours after meltthrough of the reactor
vessel. The "Summary of the Invention" paragraph in the patent
describes an entirely different configuration of three feet of
basalt bricks, six inches of depleted uranium, and a foot of
thermal insulation, for which no example calculation is given.
As shown in Section 4.2, an external cooling source is
required for cooling a 3^-00 MWt core, since the patent speaks
to a much smaller, 500 MWt, fast reactor. Representing a
combination of the BMI-1910 Spreader Concept, the Zivi Sacri-
ficial Concept, and the West-Fletcher Water-Cooled Crucible
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Concept, this proposal is rejected for barge use because of the
combination of disadvantages cited in Sections 4.2, 4.6, and
4.7. A sophisticated concept such as Jansen's, employing a
sufficient number of barriers and with appropriate heat removal
provisions, can conceptually stop a core meltdown; however, the




An analysis of the adaptability of existing core catcher
proposals to an offshore, barge-mounted plant design has been
presented. All of the concepts were found to provide some
degree of additional containment protection but were not- con-
sidered readily adaptable to the offshore plant unless major
design changes were made to the barge configuration or to the
catcher proposal to achieve weight, size, or cost compatibility.
The existing proposals and a brief summary of the major advan-
tages/disadvantages are presented in Table 4.2.
The following chapter will investigate an alternative con-
cept; a relatively cheap, light-weight, semi-passive design
incorporating a heat absorbing pebble bed. This concept combines
many of the better features of previous proposals, while elim-
















Requires 70,000 tons of U0
?
to passively
contain core; excessive cost, weight,
volume.
Excessive weight; location of required
radiators questionable; uncertainties
associated with mass of lead required,
design/operation of radiators.
Uncertainties associated with heat trans-
fer mechanism result in uncertainties
concerning amount of ceramic required
as a liner; further metallurgical and
thermophysical uncertainties; potential
steam explosion.
Reactor vessel insulation prevents
achieving required heat flux to prevent
meltthrough; uncertainty in the required
steel evaporation/condensation cycle.
Advantageous to utilize natural con-
vection/gravity flow on barge; piping
external to barge presents potential
path for escape of fission products;
sea water piping internal to barge re-
presents potential flooding casualty;
complex welded pipe bed required.





THE GRAPHITE PEBBLE BED GORE CATCHER
5.1 FOREWORD
Several existing core catcher proposals were reviewed and
analyzed in Chapter 4 for possible use on the presently en-
visioned barge-mounted nuclear plants; none was found to be
totally acceptable. In particular,
. many of the concepts require
use of large amounts of high density materials, while for barge
use smaller quantities of low density materials would be par-
ticularly desirable. One low density material, graphite, in-
corporates many additional desirable physical properties--high
thermal conductivity, heat capacity, compressive strength, and
melting point—and is therefore an excellent candidate material
for core catcher applications. This chapter introduces the
graphite pebble bed concept, summarizes correlations applicable
to functional evaluation, and then develops analytical and
experimental verification of the projected performance. Physical
property values and nomenclature used are defined in Appendices
A and 3.
5.2 MOTIVATION FOR, AND DESCRIPTION OF, THE PEBBLE BED CONCEPT
The selection of graphite as a potential core catcher
material was impelled by many favorable considerations including
its thermal and mechanical properties, as discussed in Section
5.3. The configuration in which to employ the graphite, as a
pebble bed installed in the compartment under the reactor vessel,
was dictated by many of the shortcomings and disadvantages of
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existing catcher proposals, as discussed in Chapter 4.
It is desirable to contain the meltdown products in
solid form rather than in a molten state, if possible. In this
way the debris can be rigidly maintained in a fixed position,
minimizing the possibility of undesirable chemical or physical
interactions with the potential core catcher material and with
the surroundings. In addition, any gaseous or volatile fission
products still present will be immobilized. The retention of
the meltdown products in a solid state requires the rapid
quenching of a large quantity of molten debris, followed by long
term removal of fission product decay heat at a rate sufficient
to prevent re-melting. The relative magnitude of these two
heat loads is as follows:




Total Heat = Sensible Heat + Heat of Fusion (5.1)
Qq = M(Cp (Tinit - TB ) + A p ) (5.1a)
= 9.57 x 10 7 BTU.
long term process - for a typical 1000 ttiWe plant, from








= 8 '51 x 10
10
BTU.
The quenching process thus involves the removal of a relatively
small quantity of energy, but at a high rate of removal, while
the long term process involves a much larger quantity of total
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energy (enough to reheat the original mass to its boiling point
Q
1000 times over), but at a lower rate (1.8 x 10 BTU/hr @ 1 hour
decaying to 3.4 x 10 BTU/hr @ 231 days—see Fig. 4.2). Quench-
ing the initial molten charge in water (or any liquid for that
matter) involves the potential of steam explosions; the graphite
bed thus provides a quenching medium (high thermal conductivity,
high heat capacity), while circumventing the steam explosion
problem. In addition, water from the Primary System, the Con-
tainment Spray System, and the Ice Condenser System which could
otherwise flood the core catcher compartment will drain through
the bed; the level in the bed can be controlled as necessary by
the installed Drain System as described in Chapter 2. That
chapter indicated that the total volume of water which could
potentially drain into the core catcher is about 101,600 cubic
feet (12,600 Ft 3 primary system + 42,000 Ft 3 Ice Condenser +
47,000 Ft^ Containment Spray). The total volume per cubic foot
of depth available in the watertight area (bounded by bulkheads
3 and 4 and F and H in Fig. 2.4) is 2483.95 Ft 3/?t; this figure
includes 709.7 FtVFt for the catcher compartment (for a void
fraction £ = 0.4) and 1774.25 FtVF "t for the adjacent compart-
ment. The total depth available in these compartments is 7.5
feet. Thus, if all the available water drained into the core
catcher, a prohibitive depth of 40.9 feet would be reached.
The installed Drain System must be activated by level probes
in the adjacent compartment to maintain an acceptable level in
the catcher. Once the debris is quenched and solidified, it
may be desirable to intentionally flood the bed to provide
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bottom cooling. The analysis of the Zivi Sacrificial U0
? core
catcher (Z2) in Chapter b, and the energy magnitude seen from
Eq, 5«2, indicate that some form of active cooling is needed
to remove the long term decay heat; in this respect the graphite
pebble bed design does not differ from any other potential con-
cept, and a proposed method for long-term heat removal is des-
cribed below.
Because of the division of the core catcher compartment
under the reactor vessel into four spaces by the 7h foot deep
girders, use of a crucible, per se, in this area is prohibted.
The graphite pebbles could easily be poured into these spaces,
however, and the barge bottom protected by a layer of refractory
material such as a graphite liner. Thus the configuration of
a pebble bed design is compatible with the existing spatial
layout.
By suspending the solid debris in the open lattice-work
of the graphite bed, cooling water can completely surround the
debris, increasing the available heat transfer area over a
crucible-slab geometry, some versions of which may have cooling
available only at the top surface. Thus the pebble bed design
provides a multiplicity of coolant channels without the concern
of maintaining the integrity of the post-impact catcher structure
as in solid designs.
Finally, the pebble bed design affords impact protection
for the barge bottom plating, which would not exist with a
solid crucible-type core catcher. Much of the dynamic loading
of the falling debris will be absorbed as the pebbles squeeze

110
into previously voided areas. The potential advantages of
a pebble-bed core catcher are summarized in Table 5»1.
Given the basic concept of a graphite pebble bed, there are
many ways in which it may be implemented. As previously pointed
out, the transverse girders which divide the catcher compart-
ment lead one to consider pouring the graphite bed into place,
allowing the pebbles to fall into the existing contours without
installing another crucible-type container. Since the bed
penetration rate of the molten debris will be seen (in Section
5.^) to vary directly as the square of the bed particle diameter,
it might appear desirable to utilize extremely small particles,
even a graphite powder. In addition to decreasing the bed
penetration rate, this concept could conceivable provide a "wick-
ing" action similiar to that employed in heat pipes, thus greatly
enhancing the conduction of heat away from the debris. Un-
fortunately, because it is difficult to initiate the capillary
action in a heat pipe, the concept may not work without an ela-
borate priming system being employed, and even then, the system
reliability would be questionable. Additionally, dust particles
in air are potentially explosive; a fine dust bed would also
inhibit the flow (and drainage) of water (and steam) around- the
frozen debris, reducing the available heat transfer. The small-
particle powder may also form a graphite "mud" or paste with
water, which could mobilize the bed, causing the powder to slip
out from under the heavier U0 ? , and allow the debris to sink
to the bottom of the bed. A related consideration would be the




PEBBLE-BED GORE CATCHER ADVANTAGES
1. Voided channels allow system water to drain through the
bed, reducing the potential for a steam explosion.
2. Bed is conf igurationally compatible with the existing barge
design, requiring no changes in the barge strength member
design.
3. Bed requires no crucible or other container, avoiding the
expense of designing and installing another structure.
^. Open lattice-work allows cooling v/ater to surround the
frozen debris, increasing the heat transfer area and thus
the probability of retaining the meltdown products.
5. Bed particles compress into previously voided areas upon
loading, providing impact protection from the falling
debris for the barge bottom.
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steam generated by contact of water with the debris from under-
neath impinges on the small particles, fluidizing the bed and
again allowing the debris to sink deeper into the bed. Invest-
igations (L2,Z3) of the limiting velocity before a bed is fluid-
ized have resulted in the relationship
V . + = 0-O^dp 2 (VU> (5.3)limit
/i fa0 (l-d)
= 1.503 x 10 3 d 2 ft/sec,
for d = particle diameter in inches
p
.
e = 0.40 ~
Vp =110 lbm/ft-3 ~
%ta = 0.026 lbm/ft-5 (sat steam @ 10 psig)
A»o~ '°3 1 ^ lbm/hr-ft (sat steam S> 10 psig).
Thus, for a small-particle powder size of 50 mesh (d = 0.0005
inches) the limiting steam velocity is only 0.000376 ft/sec,
while for a larger particle size (d =0.5 inch) the limiting
XT
steam velocity is 375*8 ft/sec (about one-fourth of sonic vel-
ocity)
,
and the bed is much less likely to scour while venting
steam. The potential disadvantages of a powder-bed core catcher
are summarized in Table 5«2.
It is shown in Section S>5 that a graphite bed thickness
of 7*5 feet (the depth of the core catcher compartment) is
theoretically more than sufficient (including an ample safety
margin) to stop the molten debris from contacting the barge
bottom? however, without further detailed experimental simula-
tion it is not possible to rule out a portion of the debris
funneling through the bed (although this is extremely unlikely
for a 7.5 foot bed of 0.5 inch particles— i.e., a bed depth of




POV/DER-BED CORE CATCHER DISADVANTAGES
1. Heat pipe capillary-type action is difficult to initiate,
reducing the system reliability and/or requiring elaborate
priming techniques.
2. Dust particles in air are potentially explosive.
3. Powder v/ould inhibit the flow of cooling water around the
debris, reducing the available heat transfer.




5. Small particle diameter powder is easily fluidized by
escaping steam, providing a tunneling effect to allow
debris to fall through the bed.
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bottom is prudent. Because the liner should possess many of
the same physical properties as desired for the bed material
(except that a low thermal conductivity is nov/ required to
minimize heat conduction to the barge-bottom steel), graphite
is again a preferred material; the thermal conductivity of
graphite can be adjusted from about 1.0 BTU/hr-Ft-°F to 100
BTU/hr-Ft- F by varying the porosity and/or impregnating
material (B5). Other candidate materials, such as MgO, U0 ?l
SiC, Zr02 , AlpOo, all are more dense, more expensive, and melt
at temperatures below the melting point of UOp, For this weight-
and volume— limited application, both the BTU/lbm (Cp aT) and
the BTU/Ft 3 ( ? Gp <a T) are important for both the liner and the
bed material, where ^T = Tm - T. ... Thus, the. ideal liner
material is one of low cost
;
low thermal conductivity, high
heat capacity per unit weight, and high heat capacity per unit
volume. The ideal bed material would possess these same
properties but with a hip;h thermal conductivity, enabling it
to quickly remove heat from the debris. Table 5* 3 (VI, V2 , CI,
Appendix A) summarizes these properties for the candidate
materials, indicating graphite to be the superior choice. A
ft »l «»
standard 9 inch brick is 9 long x k wide x 2.5 thick, re-
quiring about 6300 bricks to cover the catcher compartment deck.
For MgO this would involve a cost of ^33 » 138 and a total weight
of 31*7 tons; for the same thickness of graphite a cost of
$20,330 and a weight of 20.3 tons is required.
Several concepts can be envisioned to provide active cooling




CANDIDATE CORE CATCHER MATERIALS






































water could be used in a manner similar to that proposed by
West and Fletcher (V^+) and discussed in Chapter ^l-j as pointed
out in that chapter. However, this method provides a potential
escape route for fission products into the environment. A
relatively simple cooling method could be provided by adding
to the existing Containment Spray System. In the hypothetical
meltdown, after the molten debris breaches the concrete Contain-
ment Base Plate and falls into the core catcher, the spray
pumps (v/hich had been drawing water from the reactor sump formed
by the Base Plate) must shift suction to another water source.
By providing (remotely operated) suction headers into the com-
partment adjacent to the catcher compartment (bounded by bulk-
heads 3t ^i G, H, see Fig. 5*1) "the spray pumps could remove
heated water from this area, pump it through the Containment
Spray heat exchangers, and spray it back into the core catcher
compartment and pebble bed to provide cooling for the frozen
debris as shown in Fig. 5«1« A coolant circulation path
through the pebble bed, into the adjacent compartment, into the
spray pumps, through the heat exchangers, and back into the
pebble bed is therefore established by the addition of the suc-
tion header in the adjacent compartment and the spray header
in the catcher compartment. Note that these added headers
represent penetrations in the existing containment and must
therefore be provided with isolation valves in compliance with
the AEC General Design Criteria (01).
Another method which could provide complete or partial
cooling to the debris once solidified would be to flood
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'Pebble Bed Bounded "by Bulkheads 3i^tl7 * and G.
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bed via the adjacent compartment, allowing the water level to
reach a height where boiling begins, and cooling the debris with
the steam exiting from the bed into the containment volume.
For a stagnant graphite bed ( C = O.h-) whose voids are filled
with air or steam (except those voids occupied by the solidified
debris) Ref. Zk indicates an effective bed thermal conductivity
of about 0.25 BTU/hr-Ft- ?. If all the one-hour decay heat
o
were conducted down into the bed at a rate of 1.8 x 10 3TU/hr,
the graphite temperature reaches 212 ? very close to the debris
(a nominal, but meaningless, 8.1 x 10 J inches away for an
assumed debris temperature of 5072 F). Thus this method of cool-
ing would undoubtedly result in a situation where violent steam/
water chugging would occur due to intermittent contact by water,
followed by venting of the flashed steam. It is unresolved
whether the bed can accommodate this mode of operation, although
favorable considerations will be described later.
To summarize, it is proposed that a pebble bed, composed
of (nearly) spherical § inch diameter graphite pellets, be
established in the voided space below the 7.5 foot waterline
(beneath the Containment Base Plate) and directly under the
reactor vessel on the presently designed barge-mounted plant.
The compartment deck is to be lined with a layer of graphite
to protect the vessel steel plating. An active overhead spray
cooling system, utilizing the pre-existing Containment Spray
pumps, piping, and heat exchangers is to provide long-term
heat removal, perhaps in conjunction with backflooding the pebble
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bed from below via the compartment adjacent to the catcher
compartment.
The total weight of this proposed core catcher is 408.15
long tons, including both the pebble bed with a void fraction
of 0.4 (7984 ft 3 of graphite) and the 2.5 inch liner (328 ft 3 ).
From the information of Chapter 2 this results in an increased
draft of 1.05 inches and an additional bottom-plate loading of
3.58 lbf/in , compared to the upward buoyancy force of 14.4
lbf/in". Only very minor (if any) structural strength additions
need be made to accomodate this small incremental change. Fig.
2.2 indicates this compartment's center of gravity to be 36.5
feet from the barge midships ( XX ) and 18. 9 feet from the
barge centerline. The resulting moments yield an imperceptibble
heeling angle of 0.008 and trim angle of 0.00025 by the bow.
If desired, these moments may be easily compensated for by the
installed trim system on the barge. For example, the trim angle
can be removed by shifting only 23.3 tons of water (each) from
the two forward trim tanks to the two after trim tanks. At vp0.50
per pound of graphite (VI) a materials cost of .p457*l40 is
obtained: an industrial consultant has indicated that the in-
cremental cost for obtaining the product in pebble form would
be "negligible" (VI).
5.3 PERTINENT GRAPHITE PROPERTIES
As described above, the first requirement of the pebble bed
is to quench the meltdown products in order to rapidly freeze the
debris and allow subsequent water cooling without the steam
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explosion hazard. The low thermal expansion of graphite in
combination with its high thermal conductivity and strength make
graphite the most resistant to thermal shock of any known material
(C5), and thus ideal for quenching.
Graphite has been determined to be non-wetting and non-
reactive with molten metals and molten oxides (32). In particular,
experiments at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (R5) investi-
gated the interaction of molten UCU and graphite in order to
assess the capability of graphite to act as a core catcher re-
fractory material. While MgO, AlpO.-., and ZrOp all exhibted some
erosion and interaction with U0«» there was no noticeable




As mentioned above, an unusual and advantageous character-
istic of graphite is its low coefficient of thermal expansion.-
This characteristic is particularly important for the liner,
to minimize potential buckling. The expansion of graphite is
considerably lower than virtually all other materials; the
thermal expansion of copper and aluminum, for example, is about
ten times that of graphite (G5).
The emissivity of graphite for thermal radiation is high,
around 0,80-0.90, providing for an additional heat transfer
mechanism from the bed to the surroundings (05),
Graphite is currently used at temperatures exceeding the
boiling point of U0
2
(6000°F) in an air atmosphere without
catching fire (VI); there is therefore no fire hazard associated
with its use as a core catcher.
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The strength of graphite actually increases with temperature,
doubling as the temperature rises from room temperature to
2500 C— its compressive strength at room temperature is around
5100 psi (G5). Graphite's low thermal expansion coefficient
combined with its good thermal conductivity and high-temperature
strength give it excellent dimensional stability v/hen heated.
The sublimation temperature of graphite is about 6700°F,
above the boiling point of U0
?
(G5), so that under the worst-case
temperature conditions possible, the bed should remain stable.
Graphite is easily machinable, and the Union Carbide Company
manufactures graphite pebbles which were in fact utilized in the
experiment described in Section 5*6; these pebbles were not
machined, however, but resemble cinders.
5A PROPERTIES OF, AND CORRELATIONS FOR POROUS MEDIA
5.^.1 Introduction
Neither exact theoretical expressions nor experimental
correlations exist to describe the physical situation of present
interest which involves the transient flow and heat transfer of
molten matter through pebble beds. The problem is complicated
by the fact that the fluid is changing phase, and simultaneously
its physical property values are changing; in particular, the
viscosity of the molten debris changes from some finite value
to an infinite value upon freezing. Further complications exist
due to the unsteady flow situation and due to the fact that the
bed is unsaturated—not filled with the molten debris. Use of




flow should result in conservative (underestimated) heat trans-
fer values, since in the transient the thermal and flow boundary
layers are not fully developed. The solution to the governing
relation (Laplace's Equation) for a velocity distribution in
the case of gravity flow with a free surface is, to quote Ref. S2,
"extremely difficult and tedious", requiring use of hodograph
transformations. It is therefore necessary to mathematically
model the event in terms of limiting cases and rely on conser-
vatism in the model to conceptually validate the proposal
—
this is done in the next section (5.^-2). The properties govern-
ing flow and heat transfer in porous media which will be needed
later are described below.
5.^,2 Porosity of a Pebble Bed
The porosity ( £ ) , or void fraction, of a pebble bed is
the fraction of the bulk volume of the material occupied by voids.
For spherical packing in any one mode of stacking configuration,
the bed porosity is independent of the size of the sphere; this
observation is also valid for natural materials of slightly
irregular shape utilized in large beds (ratio of bed diameter
to particle diameter > 10) (S2). For randomly-packed, large beds
the void fraction ( € ) is about 39-*H>r»i although nonuniformity
in size would allow smaller particles to fill the spaces between
larger ones, decreasing the void fraction. For modeling purposes
the graphite pebbles will be considered spherical with diameter
(dp) of 0.5 inch; the bed void fraction will be taken as 0.^-0.
An expression yielding the equivalent diameter of the interstitial
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pores is given by (S2)
(J) = I ffi. I )
inches, (5.4)




5.4.3 Laminar vs Turbulent Flow
Laminar flow of a fluid is characterized by a fixed set
of streamlines; that is, a fluid element which at one instant
is traversing the same path as another must continue following
this path throughout its course. When a fluid flows through
a porous medium, the velocity vector rapidly changes from point
to point in both magnitude and direction. For steady laminar
flow, the random variations in velocity must average to zero
over any macroscopic volume; however, the inertial forces in
the direction of flow will not average to zero and hence will
.
only be negligible for low flow rates (C3).
For high flow rates, the inertial forces in the flow di-
rection cannot be neglected and the flow is said to be turbulent.
Generally the transition from laminar to turbulent flow is de-
fined in terms of an effective Reynold's number:
where dp = bed particle diameter
Go = superficial mass flow rate
/i = fluid viscosity
£ = void fraction .
The transition is said to occur around a Re of about 10 (G3).
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For assessing the depth of penetration it should be noted that
the velocity of interest is not the actual microscopic inter-
stitial velocity <V> but the macroscopic velocity of the leading
edge, termed "superficial velocity", V ; this is the velocity
that would exist in an empty bed and is given by V = < V> 6
.
5.^.4 Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow Correlations
For an assumed uniform packing with no channeling, the
pressure drop across a packed bed is given by (31)
Po-Pj = ^ (H'Vo
2
) , (5.6)
where, Po = inlet pressure at x=o
P, = outlet pressure at x=L
F = friction factor
L = bed height
X = fluid density
Vo = superficial fluid velocity
For laminar flow (Re<10), the Blake-Kozeny correlation gives
the following relationship for the superficial velocity, Vo (Bl)
Vo = P
°-P
l fcfz! __C_ Ft/hr (5.7)
L \£OA (/-£)*•
corresponding to a friction factor:
F . U-O 2 75
£ 3 gdp Go/^ (5.8)
where, Go = ? Vo.
/*. in lbm/hr-Ft
For turbulent flow (Re > 1000) the Burke-Plummer correlation




Vo = ( 2gc *~
°? £r ^±1) * - (5.9)L
corresponding to a friction factor
F = 0.875
~EJ~ . (5.10)
For the transition region (10< Re<1000), Ergen adds Eos. 5.7
and 5*9 to obtain
(Po-P,
)
, r l - C
-^T *t lV = 15 ° «5u" +1 -W. (5.1D
It is noted that for free gravity flow such as exists with the
molten debris falling through the bed under its own weight,
Po-PL = ? debris g/gQ L (lbF/Ft
2
). (5.12)
Ref. H2 investigates the cooling of a crumpled core (in a
spherical configuration) heaped upon the reactor vessel bottom




kp/kc + (1-£) 1//3 (1- kf/ks)_
(5.13)
re, L = overall bed conductivity
k = coolant conductivity
k = bed particle conductivity 1.
Ref. Zb provides graphical solutions for the effective stagnant
bed thermal conductivity based upon the ratio of the conductivities
of the bed material and the fluid occupying the interstices.
For laminar flow through a packed bed, in which heat transfer
is from the bed to the coolant, Denton (Dl) suggests a Nusselt
number (and a resulting heat transfer coefficient) given by




_ n Qn /d G \
0/
V C /Uy3 , . .
,or p_ =0.80 / p o f td_) (5.1^a)
where all properties are those of the moving fluid.
An equivalent expression for turbulent flow is suggested
in Ref. Ela as,
h = 0.^3 G G R °'3pr0.66 ( j
° P e c/T
x
or h = 0.^3 GoCp^)^) 3 (5.15a)
5.5 PERFORMANCE OF THE GRAPHITE BED
A necessary, though not sufficient, criterion for the init-
ial quenching and freezing of the debris is that the interface
temperature between the melt and the graphite pebbles be less
than the melting point of the debris. Another necessary require-
ment is that there be sufficient graphite mass enveloped to
adiabatically freeze the debris. Both of these criteria are
shown to be readily satisfied. By determining the superficial
flow velocity (V ) of the leading edge of the molten debris in
passing through the pebble bed, and by resolving the time (t)
required for this edge to freeze, one can obtain an estimate
of the depth of penetration into the bed prior to flow stoppage.
5'5«1 Interface Temperature Assuming Semi-Infinite Bodies
At the instant of contact the graphite pebbles appear as
a semi-infinite body to the melt, and vice-versa (G6)j it is
shown in Section 5*5*^ that the time required to freeze is so
small that this is a valid approximation throughout the freezing







/T = / (VkC ) d \^ , (5.16)
T, - T jnd " x i V(fkC ), J






? = 473.8 lbm/ft 3
k =1.73 3TU/hr-ft- F
C =0.09 3TU/lbm-°F
Graphite (g)i T^ = 100 °F
9" = 110 lbm/ft 3







and, T. = 866.9 F. It is therefore seen that this interface
temperature is well below the freezing point of U0p (T = 5072 F).
5.5*2 Mass of Graphite Required for Adiabatic Equilibrium
It was shov/n above that the initial quenching and freezing
process conservatively (assuming 250 tons of debris at T UQ )
7
requires the removal of about 9.57 x 10 BTU. For steady state
equilibrium at the freezing point of U0p, the mass of graphite (g)
required is:
(MC aT)^ = 9.57 x 10 7 BTU (5.17)
m = 9. 57 x 10?
g . 3 ( 5072-100)
= 64,159.3 Ibm.
A 7.5 foot deep bed covering the core catcher deck area of
1774.25 square feet with a void fraction of 0.4 contains
M^ = 7.5 x 1774.25 x 0.6 x f (5.13)
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and the mass of graphite present is 8?8,253« 75 lbm. The bed
therefore contains a factor of 12 excess graphite to perform
the initial quenching and freezing; conversely, an envelopment
of only about 6.6 inches of bed is required even without other
energy loss mechanisms.
5.5,3 Superficial Velocity Through the Bed
A combination of Eqs. 5*7 and 5»12 gives the superficial
flow velocity for laminar flow as
which, for the debris and bed properties used previously gives
= ^7.2 ft/sec.
However, the Reynold's number corresponding to this flow is
given by Eq. 5.5 as
Re =^7 (5 - 5)
= 2.3 x 10 , >> 10, the transition value,
implying the Burke -Plummer Correlation (Eq. 5*9) should be used
instead.
Combining Eqs. 5*9 and 5* 12, one obtains for turbulent flow,
v =
(j75 dP g T^r ' (5 - 20)
which yields VQ = 0.286 ft/sec and a Reynold's number of 1.^ x 10 .
Both correlations therefore indicate a definite turbulent flow
regime.
5»5»^ Time for Debris Freezing
The interstitial pore channel diameter was determined from
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Eq. 5.4 to be 0.22 inches or 0.0185 feet. An estimate of the
time to freeze may be obtained by treating the pores as cylin-
drical rods of the same diameter. The most slowly decaying
mode in a rod of cooling UOp is characterized by ( ?Z ) :
Wi = •"** • (5.21)
where X = {$*-) [~p)
and vo = 2.405... (first root of J Bessel Function).
Thus, the maximum cooldown time from 6000 F to 5072 F when
internal conduction is the limiting step, is, from Eq. 5.21,
= 0.882 seconds.
An alternate estimate of the time for the debris to cool
from the U0 2 boiling point to the UOp freezing point can be
obtained by considering the limiting case of slug flow through
the graphite bed. For an incremental element of debris of height
dx progressing downward in the x direction, the incremental rate
of heat transfer is given by
dq (BTU/hr) = hdAAT . (5.23)
where h is given by the Nusselt number for slug flow with con-
stant wall temperature (R2):
X 5.75 (5.24)
or h = 5» 75^, n 2r
and where,
dA = 27Trdx (5.25)
AT= T(x) d - Tg . (5.26)
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where d( Volume) =TTr 2dx. (5.28)








and integrating Eq. 5.29 between T UQ and T UQ ,
T - T
7~-rf = exp( -5.75kt/r2fc ) (5-30)
v g p




For debris and bed parameters used above,
t = ((O.O185) 2 (^73.0)(O.O9)/(5.75)(1.73)) ln(5900/4972)
= 0.90^ seconds.
The above models result in a very conservative estimate
of the time required to freeze the debris front, assuming in
both cases a purely conductive heat transfer process. It is
noted that these methods yield nearly equivalent results, the
differences being due to the assumption of a J Bessel Function
temperature distribution in Eq. 5. 22 and a parabolic temperature
distribution in Eq. 5»31» A final model, due to Mikic (M2),
includes the volumetric heat production (q''') from fission
product decay and provides a more realistic estimate of the time
to freeze. The molten debris is considered to fill the void
spaces in the bed so that a heat balance on an element of melt
moving through the bed yields (modeled as if the pebbles are
moving past the melt with superficial velocity V ) :
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£q"« x = Vo(?C ) 2 (T-T0f2 )(l-€) + C?Cp )'i.fe^-AX (5.32)
or
«••• =W 2I^ + <*v* Tt (5.33)
where subscript 2 refers to graphite properties,
subscript 1 refers to debris properties,
dx = V f-
t - time for a pebble initially at T 9 (with an
instantaneous boundary change to T
1
) to




Thus, Eq. 5*33 results in
£9'!' = (?C
p
) 2 f (1-6) + (VCp)^
The particular solution to Eq. 5»3^ is






and the homogeneous solution is
-
..i^lZ 11=11 i
for the initial condition
9, = C exp £

















The complete solution to Eq. 5»3^> given by the sum of the
homogeneous (Eq. 5. 36) and particular (Eq. 5.35) solutions, with
the coefficient, C, determined from Eq. 5. 37 > is:
= Q eXJ- iS^oh. ir£ 1] + /9"; -1_ i-exP [< ?G^^ ^ -tl
(5.38)
where 9^ = T t - T = ^972 °Fs m, 1 o,2
9 = T «- TCI" o,2 = 5900 °F.
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The value for C is determined from solutions plotted in Ref . N&




and thus t- 0.23 seconds. The volumetric heat generation rate
is determined from the decay heat rate at 1 hour and the volume
of the debris as
* hr-f1? Volume (ft^) \5**V)
= 1.3 x 10 8 BTU/hr
250ton x20001b_x 1 ft3
ton "57378 lb
= 1.75 x 105 BTU/hr-ft3
The ratio (?C ) ?/(?G ). is determined from the previously quoted
properties of the debris and graphite as
(?c ) 2 = Oj^L(o.jo) = k (5W
( >Vi
The ratio (l-£)/G for 6 of 0.40 is
— = 1.5 (5.^-2)
Inserting the results of Eqs. 5»39» 5«^0» 5«*Hi and 5.^2 into
Eq. 5«38> one obtains
1*72 - 5900exP [- ^g^^ t] + 1*20^0^^
1 .exp(-^Z2MiL^t)
(5.^3)
and t = 0.0^0 seconds.
This value for the quench time is a factor of 20 less than






Table 5*^ summarizes the velocities, time to freeze, and
penetration depths for the various models used in Sections 5*5*3
and 5*5*^*
Table 5.k
SUMMARY OF PREDICTED VELOCITIES AND









The resulting Reynold's Number
invalidates use of this corre-
lation. Upper limit of use is
Re=10, while this velocity
yields Re=2.3xl06,
Re=l.*JoclCr indicates definite















0.882 sec 3.02 in.
0.904- sec 3.1° in.
Comment
Conductive mode of heat
transfer decay assumed.
Conservative.
Assumes laminar slug flow,
conductive heat transfer,
and again results in a
conservative estimation
of the freeze time.
0.0^-0 sec 0.14 in. Includes effect of decay
heat. Most realistic model.
6.60 in. Adiabatic heat balance.
5*5*6 Post-Freeze Penetration
The previous section indicates that the debris will freeze
almost immediatley upon contacting the graphite pebble bed, form-
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ing its own "UO
?
lined-crucible." If the fission product decay
heat is not removed from the frozen mass, the debris and ad-
jacent graphite pebbles will gradually heat up, and the melt-
down products v/ill remelt and slump further into the graphite
;
this slumping/freezing progression will continue until active
cooling is initiated or until the debris reaches the catcher
bottom. An estimate of this rate of penetration following the
initial freeze can be obtained through an adiabatic envelopment
model by equating the fission product decay heat rate to the
rate of heat absorbed by the graphite bed plus the rate of
melting of the debris. Since it is questionable how much debris
must be melted to allow downward slumping, this heat of fusion
will be neglected to provide a conservative estimate of the
penetration rate, V . Thus,





p ( 110 )(0.4)( 1774. 25) (5072-100)
= 0.464 ft/hr.




and it is seen that the time span available to initiate active
cooling is well within reason.
The waiting-time available for active cooling may be limited
by another consideration—the time required to heat the compart-
ment bulkheads and deck to a temperature where the steel loses
its strength. The entire graphite bed could be adiabatically
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heated from 100 °F (assumed initial temperature) to 1000 °F
(assumed steel temperature limit) in about 1.32 hours at the
o
decay heat rate of 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr. This is a conservative
indication of the time to initiate active cooling since the
effective bed thermal conductivity was shown in Section 5«2 to
be less than many refractory materials (0.25 BTU/hr-ft- F), and
thus the bed would actually insulate the compartment bulkheads
and deck. Additionally, the process (even with no external
cooling) would not be adiabatic, some heat being removed by





7 Post-Freeze Bottom Cooling
Flooding the graphite bed from below via installed drain
lines or via drainage from installed reactor systems is the
preferred cooling method, since no additional headers (and sub-
sequent containment penetrations) or design changes are required,
contrary to the above-bed spray method of cooling.
Steam at atmospheric pressure has a specific volume of
26.8 FtVlbm and a heat of vaporization of 970.^ BTU/lbm (K2).
If all of the decay heat energy available goes to boil water,
about 1.86 x 10-5 lbm/hr, or 1^00 ft^ steam/sec, must be vaporized
o
to remove the one-hour decay heat rate of 1.8 x 10 BTU/hr. The
total void volume available in the bed for steam and water is
5322.75 cubic feet. Allowing 50^ of this space for steam and
50% for water, an amount of steam equivalent to about 52.676 of
the free volume will be vaporized each second. If the debris
solidifies over an area of ^90 square feet (a 25 foot diamet
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circular disc), there remains 713 • 7 square feet of voided area
available for venting the steam. At 1^00 ft-ysec "the resulting
steam velocity (superficial) is only about 1
.
96 ft/sec, a
gentle steaming rate. Conversely, to prevent fluidizing the
bed, it was shown in Section 5»2 that a steam velocity of
375« 8 ft/sec must not be exceeded; to vent the required 1400
ft /sec at this limiting velocity would require only 3.73 square
feet of open flow area. This method of cooling therefore appears
to be theoretically feasible, and the top surface, above-bed
spray may not be required to cool the debris.
5.6 EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
A concern with utilizing lightweight graphite pebbles to
stop the flow of the heavy molten debris was that the melt
would rapidly float the immersed graphite, thereby avoiding
sufficient contact for effective heat transfer, and hence pro-
gress to the vessel bottom. Although the analysis in Eas . 5«32-
5.^3 would appear to rule out this possibility, the potential
consequences were considered sufficiently important to warrant
experimental investigation.
Since the primary purpose of the experiment was to inves-
tigate the buoyancy problem, a model for U0 ? was chosen based
primarily upon density similarity. An obvious choice was lead,
with a density essentially identical to that of U0 . Lead is
also a reasonable substitute for U0 2 as a heat transfer model.
In particular, it was shown in Section 5«5«1 that the transient
heat transfer process, especially during the rapid quench, de-
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pends upon the value of JTiTCp for the molten material. The
ratio of this parameter for lead to that for U0 o is
(?K CPV \ K = f(6?8) (9Q? (0>0?8) )K 1A9 iSAS)
, o v -% ) \ (600) (2.6) (0.10) I
\ \ & ^p^uo
2
/
For future investigations in this area, one could match this
quantity exactly by utilizing a lead alloy (lead and Ei, Cd,
In, Sn, etc.) to slightly reduce the alloy's thermal conductivity.
Another comparison of the validity of a lead model may be seen
by comparing the turbulent heat trar.sfer coefficients from
Eq. 5.15,
h « ?cP (y//,) - 3 (-^jl_) ' 66 is-
1*)
or
h o< ? !'3 op
1 ' 66 k "°- 66 A °'36









hUQ loooj V 0.10 j U.^y V3763J
=(1.127) * (0.201) v (0.^31) * (1.188)
= 0.116
As can be seen the large difference in heat capacity is re-
sponsible for the discrepancy in h. However, another comparison
of the heat transfer coefficients of lead and uranium dioxide
may be obtained from the laminar, slug flow analysis in which
hT)









Yet another comparison is afforded by Eq, 5 • 1^ » describing
the laminar flow Nusselt number for packed-bed flow. Here,
h * k - 667 A' ' 367 cp - 333 ? °- 7 , (5.W)
such that hpv/hTjQ = 1 • 53 • The true relationship for the heat
transfer coefficient comparison probably lies somewhere between
the values predicted by Eqs. 5«^6~5»^8.
The thermal diffusivity (k/^Cp) of lead is 8.6 times as
large as that of U0
? ,
again primarily because of the discrepancies
in Cp and k. This difference results in the lead cooling faster
than U0
2 .
The experiment to ensure that the high density molten debris
would not float the lighter graphite pebbles consisted of pour-
ing 12 pounds of molten lead at 7^0 F into a 10 inch diameter
container filled with graphite pebbles of a nearly spherical
shape. The pebbles had an average diameter of about 0.2.5 inch.
Upon being poured into the container, the molten lead did not
push aside or float the pebbles but, in fact, froze and plugged
the flow almost instantly upon contacting the graphite (which
was initially at a room temperature of about 80°P). The average
penetration depth of the molten lead was about 1.75 inches.
There were no noticeable interactions with the graphite, and no
external means of cooling the container were provided.
All the heat transfer coefficient correlations previously
considered indicate that for a hypothetical melt v/ith an
extremely small value of the thermal conductivity, k, a similarly
small heat transfer coefficient is obtained, and the molten
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material should not transfer heat rapidly enough to freeze
prior to reaching the bed bottom. Experimental verification
of this was obtained by pouring molten wax (ks 0.14- BTU/hr-?t-°P,
compared to 9»3 fot Pb) through an identical graphite bed as used
in the molten lead experiments; while the lead froze almost in-
stantly, reaching an average depth of 1.75 inches, the wax
passed through the bed, pooling at the container bottom. Con-
versely, if the bed material had possessed an extremely low
thermal conductivity, the melt again could not freeze: in the
limit of zero conductivity, there would be no heat transfer.
Thus the choice of a high conductivity bed material such as
graphite is a vital one.
5.7 SUMMARY
A new core catcher concept, utilizing graphite in a
pebble-bed configuration, has been described. Although an
exact analytical solution to the penetration depth has not been
obtained, several conservative analytical models were described,
each of which verifies the concept of freezing the molten melt-
down products with a depth far less than that proposed for use
on the barge-mounted plant. Long-term cooling of the bed may
be provided after the debris is frozen by adding suction supply
headers and spray headers to the existing piping of the Con-
tainment Spray System, and then utilizing that system's pumps
and heat exchangers, and ultimately the ocean, as the heat sink.
This cooling method can be augmented or completely supplanted
by back-flooding the bed, providing steam and water as a coolant
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for the debris. Over an hour is available (conservatively) be-
fore the bed heats to 1000 F, causing the compartment's steel
bulkheads to lose structural strength. If this limit is not
reached, then over 16 hours would pass before the re-molten
debris slumped completely through the bed. In either case





6 . 1 SUMMARY
Increasing energy demands, coupled with environmental
restrictions upon power plant siting, and potential economies
in construction, have led to plans for offshore siting of central
power stations. The presence of open ocean rather than earth
underneath the plant places increased emphasis on the provision
of added insurance for retention of core meltdown products in
the event, however unlikely, of a gross reactor core meltthrough.
This thesis has evaluated existing proposals designed to mitigate
the effects of a meltdown accident and has found none to be
totally satisfactory for use on the presently envisioned barge-
mounted power plant proposed by Offshore Fower Systems. A new
concept, the graphite pebble bed, was then presented and was
shown to circumvent many of the problems associated with the
other designs.
In order to evaluate the compatibility of various core
catcher proposals with the presently envisioned barge -mounted
plant, potential interactions of a core catcher with other
shipboard systems were analyzed, and the area and volume avail-
able for the location of the device were established. This
plant (a standard V/estinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor and
Turbine-Generator system) contains over 100,000 cubic feet of .
water which could conceivably drain into a core catcher during




to reject heat at the rate of 5«6 x 10 3TU/hr to the ocean.
The structural framework of the barge forms a compartment direct-
ly under the reactor vessel, and below the Containment Base
Plate, of dimensions kf x 37 3A' x 7 1/2 • ; this area is fur-
ther divided into four spaces by 7 1/2' deep transverse girders.
The barge is designed to float at a draft of 32 feet with less
than 1 pitch and 0.7 roll, placing upper limits on the accept-
able weight and moment of a proposed core catcher.
An analytical evaluation of the meltdown sequence, devel-
oping the quantitative aspects of the accident needed to eval-
uate the capability of a proposed core catcher has been presented.
In particular, the major events of the accident and the expected
times of occurrence were determined to be: Blowdown {5-^5 sec);
Gore Heatup/Collapse (10-60 min) ; Grid Support Meltthrough (30
min) ; Reactor Vessel Meltthrough (20-120 min); Containment Base
Plate Meltthrough (22 min). Neglecting the time required to
meltthrough the Containment Base Plate and ignoring the loss
of volatile fission products from the molten debris, it was con-
cluded that an extremely conservative estimate of 250 tons of
molten debris at 6000 F, emitting decay heat at a rate of 1.8
x 10 BTU/hr, would be considered to enter the proposed core
catcher 1 hour after blowdown.
The analytical description of the meltdown accident and
the resulting development of a worst-case heat load on the core
catcher, along with the volume and hydrostatic considerations
generated from the description of the barge plant, provided
data for a detailed evaluation of existing core catcher proposals.
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All of the proposals were found to be at least partially defi-
cient, primarily due to weight/volume requirements, high cost,
excessive complexity, metallurgical and thermophysical un-
certainties, and potential steam explosion hazards.
A new concept employing a graphite pebble bed--whose voids
provide for water drainage to minimize the possibility of
steam explosions, which is configurationally compatible v/ith
the existing barge compartmentation and requires no additional
crucible for support, whose open lattice -work allows cooling
water to completely surround the frozen debris, and which affords
impact protection to the barge bottom—was introduced. Graphite
as both bed material and bottom liner was shown to be superior
to other candidate materials due to its relatively low cost,
high heat capacity (per pound and per unit volume), high contact
thermal conductivity for the particles in the bed (and low
conductivity for the liner), and high strength. The total weight
of the catcher was shown to be Jj-08.15 long tons, resulting in
an additional barge draft of a tolerable 1.05 inches, Mathemat-
ical models describing the entry of the molten material into
a bed of 0.5 inch diameter graphite pellets resulted in a
penetration depth before initial freezing of only a few inches.
Without external cooling the bed and debris v/ould heat up and
the debris would gradually slump through the bed, potentially
overheating the barge bulkhead structure or reaching the bottom
of the bed in from 1 to 16 hours, allowing sufficient time to
initiate active water cooling: there is little danger of steam
explosions when water contacts the now-solidified mass.

1M
Finally, experimental results v/ere described which con-
ceptually verify the proposal, in which molten lead was poured




6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
No effort has been made in this thesis to optimize the
pebble-bed design or to extensively evaluate the means of post-
freeze cooling of the debris. Future work in this area should
therefore have as specific objectives: (1) reduction of the
bed thickness, optimizing the overall weight and cost of the
design; (2) investigation of the use of other, cheaper materials
(such as cobblestones) as a base for the catcher, employing the
graphite bed only for the top layer; (3) elimination of the
graphite liner, and; (k) more detailed evaluation of the post-
freeze cooling method, with a major goal being elimination of
the proposed overhead spray.
To help investigate reducing the bed thickness and replac-
ing some of the graphite with a cheaper material, it is recom-
mended that an improved mathematical model, which evaluates
the effect of debris property changes, especially viscosity,
as the debris nears freezing, be developed.
Additional meltdown simulations on a larger scale and
utilizing a material which more closely resembles molten U0 ?
is recommended. A brief, evaluation of the validity of utilizing
molten lead to simulate molten UOp was presented in Chapter 5;
it was shown that not all the necessary similitude for a heat
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transfer analysis is provided by the lead, and it is suggested
that a lead alloy employing tin, bismuth, or indium might be
used to better simulate the UCU properties.
To investigate elimination of the graphite liner and op-
timization of the post-freeze cooling method, additional
calculations, and more importantly, experimental simulations
of this phase of the meltdown are strongly recommended. The
calculations and simulations of the post-freeze period should
have as their objectives: (1) the determination of the heat
removal rate from the debris by bed conduction; (2) assessment
of bed and the surrounding compartment steel heat-up rates if
cooling is delayed; (3) measurement of the slumping rate of
the solidified mass; (*0 investigation of the effects on bed
stability of steam venting and water chugging, and; (5) evalu-
ation of the cooling of the suspended debris from below in the
two-phase flow regime. «
6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
A reactor core meltdown at sea for the size reactors cur-
rently being considered for offshore power generation has poten-
tially serious consequences, and even despite the demonstrably
low probability of occurrence, the added expense of an additional
margin of safety to prevent the uncontrolled release of fission
products to the environment may be justifiable. Recent reports
indicate a potential proliferation of the offshore plants, now
including Europe and the west coast of the United States (N7, S6);
Offshore Power Systems now anticipates proposals for six more

units for the east coast in about two months in addition to
two units already committed for PSEG of New Jersey (D5) . Thus,
the question as to whether added meltthrough protection is
justifiable will undoubtedly soon be raised, debated, and de-
cided. If a core catcher is mandated, the graphite bed proposed
in this thesis is relatively inexpensive, maintenance-free, easy
to install, and conceptually successful in stopping and re-
taining the meltdown products.
Finally, special attention is called to the German pebble-
bed reactor (AYR). The experience obtained on this concept
has obvious application to the design of a pebble-bed core
catcher, and this project is a suggested source for acquisition





COLLECTION OF PERTINENT DATA
Evaluation of the core meltdown accident requires an input
of many physical properties and parameters. V/idely varying
values have been utilized in different studies, resulting in
significantly dissimilar conclusions.
The data considered germane to meltdown evaluation are re-
viewed below, indicating the source of the proposed value and,
identified by an asterisk *, the value selected for use in this





























































































































































































































































Fuel rod temp @ 25 sec







































































o< thermal diffusivity, Ft/hr
P coefficient of volume expansion, F~
Cp specific heat, BTU/lbm-°F
d system characteristic diameter, Ft
D diffusion coefficient, Ft/hr
e total emissivity, dimensionless
£ packed bed void fraction, dimensionless
g gravitational acceleration, Ft/hr
2
gt constant, lbm Ft/lbf-hr
p. fi^mO P*
Gr Grashof Number ( = ' . ), dimensionless
h heat transfer coefficient, BTU/hr-Ft 2-°F
fc thermal conductivity, BTU/hr-Ft-°F
L system characteristic length, Ft
fe heat of fusion, BTU/lbm
A heat of vaporization, BTU/lbm
A dynamic viscosity, lbm/hr-Ft
Nu Nusselt Number (=—r-
-), dimensionless
m mass Flow rate, lbm/hr
Pr Prandtl Number (=- ? ' ) , dimensionless
Q total system heat, BTU
q total system heat rate, BTU/hr
q* total system heat rate per unit area, BTU/Ft -hr
q"
'
total system heat rate per unit volume, BTU/Ft -hr





Sc Schmidt Number (= dry- ) , dimensionless
t time, hr
f" time constant, hr~
Tm melting (freezing) point, F
Tv boiling (condensing) point, F
u,v,w velocity in x,y,z direction, Ft/sec
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